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PROSECUTING CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE ON
CONTINGENCY FEES: LOOKING FOR PROFIT IN
ALL THE WRONG PLACES
Louis S. Rulli *
Civil asset forfeiture has strayed far from its intended purpose. Designed to give law enforcement powerful
tools to combat maritime offenses and criminal enterprises, forfeiture laws are now used to prey upon
innocent motorists and lawful homeowners who are never charged with crimes. Their only sins are that
they are carrying legal tender while driving on busy highways or providing shelter in their homes to adult
children and grandchildren who allegedly sold small amounts of low-level drugs. Civil forfeiture abuses
are commonplace throughout the country with some police even armed with legal waivers for property
owners to sign on the spot, permanently handing over their cash under intimidating and coercive conditions.
These widespread abuses are attributable to many factors. Backed by strong law-enforcement lobbies, civil
forfeiture laws place low burdens of proof on government prosecutors while providing weak protections for
property owners. No state provides for a right to counsel in civil forfeiture cases, and default judgments
abound, resulting in high percentages of takings that are never tested in the courts. But, most significantly,
it is civil forfeiture’s built-in profit motive that fuels persistent abuses as prosecutorial and police budgets
benefit directly from the huge amount of forfeiture proceeds amassed each year. So long as civil forfeiture
laws direct that all, or most, forfeiture proceeds flow to prosecutors who make the decisions on whether to
pursue forfeiture, modest Americans will wrongfully lose their hard-earned property.
While many states have enacted recent reforms at the margins of civil forfeiture, most states still retain a
strong profit motive that is embedded in their laws. Some states, like Indiana, have supersized this profit
motive by authorizing private lawyers to prosecute civil forfeiture cases on contingency fees, winning as
much as they can for themselves from the property they can successfully forfeit. What was once billed as a
weapon needed to fight crime is now a voracious grab of property for budgetary gain.
This Article reviews the ethical prohibition on the use of contingency fees in criminal cases and argues
that the same reasoning should apply to quasi-criminal cases such as the prosecution of civil forfeiture
cases. In support of this argument, the Article examines court data in civil forfeiture cases prosecuted by
government lawyers in Indiana’s most populous county and compares it to cases prosecuted by a
well-known private attorney on behalf of multiple Indiana counties who is compensated exclusively by
contingency fees. The data, though limited, raises troubling concerns. In cases prosecuted by the private
attorney, the data reveals much higher default rates, significantly lower settlement rates, and a marked
decrease in the amount of property returned to owners. Moreover, it is not only property owners who lose.
The data suggests that the Indiana Common School Fund is also a big loser when the pursuit of profit
prevails over the interests of justice.
Immediate action is needed to prohibit contingency fees in the prosecution of civil forfeiture cases as they
are unethical and compromise the prosecutor’s sworn obligation to pursue justice above all. Courts, as
well, should refuse to enforce contingency contracts presented by private lawyers for prosecuting civil
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forfeiture cases as they violate public policy. Unless this bounty system is ended, innocent property
owners—largely from low-income families and communities of color—will continue to lose their lawful
property to the pursuit of profit.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifty years, the nation’s war on drugs 1 and tough-on-crime
policies 2 have transformed the criminal justice system into a profitable
revenue-producer at the expense of low-income families and communities of
color. 3 Reluctant to raise taxes to pay for criminal justice needs, state and local
governments have turned to fines, court costs, probationary supervision
charges, and user fees to raise revenues. 4 The financial burdens imposed by
these costs have driven families deeper into debt and have imposed formidable
barriers to emerging from poverty. 5 When criminal justice fees are unpaid,
individuals remain under state supervision for longer than necessary and are
often prevented from benefitting from legislative reforms designed to wipe

1. On June 17, 1971, President Nixon announced a new top national priority: the war on drugs. See
Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug Problem, RICHARD NIXON
FOUND. (June 29, 2016), https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404.
2. See Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-oncrime-drug-sentencing/360983 (discussing the history of “tough on crime” legislation beginning with the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986).
3. Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, 4 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 205, 212 (2017) (“Fines, fees,
and forfeitures can have devastating consequences on those who are financially vulnerable, particularly in
low-income communities and communities of color that are most likely to be heavily policed.” (footnote
omitted)).
4. See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), https://governing.com/archive/govaddicted-to-fines.html (citing a large national analysis of fine revenues and the extent to which they fund
budgets). The study found that “in hundreds of jurisdictions throughout the country, fines are used to fund
a significant portion of the budget”; “[r]ural areas with high poverty have especially high rates” as do
jurisdictions with “limited tax bases or those with independent local municipal courts.” Id. The report found
that “[t]here’s a culture that’s built up over time of tolerance and normalization of this idea that courts are
there for revenue generation,” quoting Lisa Foster, co-director of the Fines and Fees Justice Center. Id. In
rural Dooly County, Georgia, for example, the report found that the county realized “$4 million in fines and
forfeitures in fiscal [year] 2018, [representing] just over a quarter of its general fund revenues.” Id.; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015)
(following the high-profile police shooting of Michael Brown by the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department,
the Department of Justice found that Ferguson police prioritized generating revenue from writing tickets,
drawing sharp focus to the practice); Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 22 (2018) (“Across the country, many lawmakers use economic sanctions in order
to avoid increasing taxes while maintaining governmental services, with some lawmakers even including
increases [to revenues generated from economic sanctions] in projected budgets.” (footnote omitted));
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 258 (1989) (“[T]he government of Vermont
has not . . . used the civil courts to extract large payments or forfeiture[s] for the purpose of raising revenue
or disabling some individual.”).
5. See Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1728 (2015) (“In many jurisdictions,
debt from criminal courts carries interest and late fees, thereby multiplying the financial burden solely on
those debtors who are least able to pay . . . . When coupled with these debilitating collateral consequences,
these debts impose an enduring burden that can exceed the penalty imposed for a crime.” (footnote omitted)).
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clean minor offenses and promote successful reentry into society. 6
Communities of color disproportionately bear the burden of these financial
legal obligations. 7
The criminalization of poverty has many contributing streams. Civil asset
forfeiture is a major, underrecognized contributor that systematically extracts
wealth from low-income communities by seizing their cash, cars, and homes.
For many years, civil forfeiture operated in the shadows of our justice system.
Under the banner of fighting crime, civil forfeiture has emerged as a major
revenue-producer for law enforcement, netting billions of dollars yearly for
police and prosecutors. 8 The lucrative nature of civil forfeiture has incentivized
widespread abuses perpetrated against communities of color and vulnerable
individuals, fueled by direct payoffs to budgets of prosecutors and police from
forfeited proceeds.
In fact, civil forfeiture is big business. Between 2001 and 2014, deposits in
the U.S. Department of Justice and Treasury forfeiture accounts totaled almost
$29 billion. 9 In a single year, law-enforcement “agencies in 26 states and the
District of Columbia took in more than $254 million” through their forfeiture
activities. 10 Between 2001 and 2014, local police alone seized over $2.5 billion
using federal civil forfeiture laws, more than 80% of which came from people
who were not charged with a crime. 11
Despite such enormous grabs of private property, Americans remain
largely unaware that confiscatory laws permit the government to seize their cars
and cash, and even their homes, without ever being charged with a crime. 12
6. Clean Slate legislation in Pennsylvania is one example: reforms enacted to wipe old, minor offenses
from criminal records were blocked if costs and fines were not paid in full. See Laurie Mason Schroeder, In
One Year, Pa.’s Clean Slate Law Has Erased 35 Million Crimes. What’s Next?, MORNING CALL (June 30, 2020),
https://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-nws-pennsylvania-clean-slate-law-one-year-20200630-ges77qb
3ffahhiznbjzjtelq7q-story.html. Another example involves voting rights in which reform legislation permits
citizens with certain prior criminal offenses to be eligible for voting, but only if they have paid off their costs
and fines. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 4, at 9 (“Ferguson law enforcement efforts are focused on
generating revenue.”); see also id. at 62 (noting that law-enforcement practices “disproportionately harm
African American[]” residents).
8. See Dick Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, 2015 INST. FOR JUST.; see
also Developments in the Law: Policing, supra note 5, at 1731 (“[C]ivil forfeiture has become more a way to fund
supposed crime-fighting than a way to actually fight crime.”).
9. Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 5.
10. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted). According to the Institute for Justice, Texas alone “took in $50 million
in 2017 through criminal and civil asset forfeiture.” See Brad Polumbo, New Hope for Civil Forfeiture Reform,
DISPATCH (July 2, 2020), https://thedispatch.com/p/new-hope-for-civil-forfeiture-reform.
11. See Developments in the Law: Policing, supra note 5, at 1732 n.67 (citing Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Asset
Seizures Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/
2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spending.
12. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (holding that a criminal conviction is not necessary
for the government to seize private property). Until the war on drugs, the use of civil forfeiture was largely
limited to maritime operations.
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Based upon a legal fiction that the property has done wrong, the government
seizes and forfeits private property without any obligation to pay compensation
to the lawful owner. This fiction is usually met in disbelief by innocent
Americans who lose their property at disturbing rates. 13 While there are many
different federal and state civil forfeiture laws, most ordinary Americans
encounter civil forfeiture at the state and local level while driving on busy
highways or in connection with allegations of minor drug activity in their
neighborhoods. 14 As studies have documented, traffic stops and drug-related
interventions disproportionately impact people of color, and therefore, civil
forfeiture of private property has its greatest impact upon low-income and
minority communities. 15
Civil forfeiture laws give prosecutors substantial power when fighting crime
while, at the same time, minimizing basic safeguards for property owners. 16
Unlike criminal cases, civil forfeiture laws do not provide a right to counsel for
the poor, 17 leaving low-income families to defend against the loss of their
property without any legal help. And even when property owners are able to
afford a lawyer, the government’s seizure of modest amounts of cash and
vehicles often make it economically infeasible to hire a lawyer because legal fees
often exceed the value of seized property. 18
13. Congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000 (CAFRA) revealed default rates in civil forfeiture as high as 80%. See Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact
of CAFRA: Expanding Access to Counsel and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP.
87, 88 (2001) (“One of the most disturbing aspects of civil forfeiture practice is the extraordinarily high rate
of uncontested forfeitures. By most accounts, 80% of all forfeitures are uncontested.”).
14. This Article focuses primarily on state and local forfeiture laws and law-enforcement practices
related to drug offenses as this is where most ordinary Americans confront civil asset forfeiture.
15. For example, a Cook County, Illinois review of 23,000 seizures found that the overwhelming
number of civil forfeiture cases were in the city’s poor and black neighborhoods. See C.J. Ciaramella, Poor
Neighborhoods Hit Hardest by Asset Forfeiture in Chicago, Data Shows, REASON (June 13, 2017),
https://reason.com/2017/06/13/poor-neighborhoods-hit-hardest-by-asset. See also Louis S. Rulli, Seizing
Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in
Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1141 (2017) (“[A]n array of analyses conducted by media outlets
and advocacy organizations [indicates] that people of color are disproportionately impacted by civil asset
forfeiture.”); Brian D. Kelly, Fighting Crime or Raising Revenue? Testing Opposing Views of Forfeiture, 2019 INST.
FOR JUST 16 (finding from a decade’s worth of data from the U.S. Department of Justice’s forfeiture program
that “the linkage between unemployment and forfeiture is at least highly suggestive, indicating a worsening
economic environment leads to greater reliance on forfeiture and an improving economic environment to
less”).
16. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017), denying cert. to $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State,
No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536, at *1 (Tex. App. July 16, 2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Whether
forfeiture is characterized as civil or criminal carries important implications for a variety of procedural
protections, including the right to a jury trial and the proper standard of proof.”).
17. See Rulli, supra note 13, at 88–89 (noting that no states provide for such a right and that the federal
right under CAFRA is limited to homes that are the primary residences of indigent homeowners).
18. See Radley Balko, Opinion, Study: Civil Asset Forfeiture Doesn’t Discourage Drug Use or Help Police Solve
Crimes, WASH. POST (June 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/11/study-civilasset-forfeiture-doesnt-discourage-drug-use-or-help-police-solve-crimes. Studies have shown that the
average forfeiture amount in Washington, D.C. is $141 and the median forfeiture amount in Philadelphia is
$178. Id. A Mississippi seizures review of 315 cases found only six instances where the property was valued
at more than $60,000. Id. The small amounts show that police and prosecutors are pursuing the bulk of civil
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Civil forfeiture laws are complex. Without legal help, unrepresented
property owners are intimidated and overmatched by superior government
resources. Unknowingly, property owners routinely waive constitutional and
statutory defenses that should protect their property. 19 Many individuals are
unable to attend multiple court hearings about their property because they
cannot jeopardize their employment or afford to lose wages from missed work.
As a result, many individuals simply give up and walk away from their property
even though they may have meritorious defenses. This is reflected in
unacceptably high default rates that have plagued civil forfeiture over several
decades. 20
Nonetheless, prosecutors and judges readily accept such one-sided court
outcomes that stand untested. Without property owners present, trial judges
rubber-stamp forfeiture claims and rarely require prosecutors to offer a prima
facie showing that there is sufficient evidence to justify the permanent taking
of private property.
When property owners do present a defense, they learn that civil forfeiture
laws are designed to make it as easy as possible for the government to prevail.
Backed by influential lobbies in state capitals, prosecutors have routinely
secured the passage of forfeiture laws that place only the lowest evidentiary
burden of proof upon the government, deny indigent property owners a right
to counsel, and shift the burden of proving innocence to property owners. Most
civil forfeiture laws do not require that property owners be convicted of, or
even charged with, a crime, and they rarely set minimum thresholds for cash
forfeitures. 21 Unless constitutional defenses are expressly raised, trial courts
silently permit their unknowing waiver and routinely approve forfeitures
without ascertaining whether a property’s fair value is grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of the underlying criminal offense. 22
This is all troubling enough. But, perhaps most concerning is that civil
forfeiture laws generally direct all, or almost all, forfeited funds to prosecutors

forfeiture cases for amounts that make it economically infeasible to hire counsel to fight to get their property
back. Id.
19. There are important affirmative defenses to civil forfeiture petitions that are waived if not properly
asserted. They include statutory defenses such as the innocent owner defense and constitutional defenses
under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
20. See Rulli, supra note 13, at 88 (“By most accounts, 80% of all forfeitures are uncontested.”).
21. Since 2014, more than thirty-four states have enacted varying reforms to their state forfeiture laws.
Three states have now abolished civil forfeiture, several others require a criminal conviction, and a few others
impose a minimum threshold. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/activism/legislation/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
22. While Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause applies to the states, this constitutional guarantee is not serving its protective purpose as long as
unrepresented parties are unaware of this defense and courts do not, on their own, examine whether the
government’s taking is disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged offense.
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and police with little transparency or accountability. 23 This has led
law-enforcement agencies to rely on forfeiture proceeds to pay significant
portions of their budgets. 24 While civil forfeiture laws differ among states, most
embed this profit incentive and tilt the scales of justice heavily in the
government’s favor, thereby encouraging abuses that distort prosecutorial
decision-making and undermine public confidence in our justice system. For
too long, we have justified punitive forfeitures of private property from
ordinary citizens without compensation on the rationalization that these are
considered merely civil cases and therefore do not require stronger protections
that we demand in criminal cases. Where prosecutors have a choice to pursue
either civil or criminal forfeiture, it is not surprising that they overwhelmingly
pursue civil forfeiture because of its easy path. 25 This remains true for federal
forfeitures, as well, even though Congress intended greater use of criminal
forfeiture when it enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000. 26
With civil forfeiture practices now deeply entrenched, this Article briefly
reviews widespread forfeiture abuses perpetrated on highways and in minority
neighborhoods that net law enforcement huge amounts of revenue each year.
These abuses can be laid squarely at the feet of forfeiture laws that direct all, or
most, forfeiture funds to the very prosecutorial offices which make decisions
whether to pursue forfeiture in the first place. This misdirection of forfeiture
proceeds breeds a strong profit motive that raises serious conflicts of interest
and encourages self-dealing that undermine the integrity and fairness of law
enforcement’s actions.
To make matters worse, some states, such as Indiana, have taken this profit
motive a step farther. Indiana authorizes government prosecutors to hire
private lawyers to prosecute civil forfeiture cases who are then paid on a
contingency-fee basis. 27 As a result, the more property a private lawyer can
forfeit, the more money the lawyer can make for personal gain. In this system,
a lawyer’s drive for private profit supersedes the government’s obligation to
pursue justice.
In this Article, I contend that contingency fees have no place in the
prosecution of civil forfeiture actions. To support this contention, this Article
reviews several patterns of abusive civil forfeiture practices that are motivated
by law enforcement’s voracious appetite for new revenues. I then look at
23. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, supra note 21 (noting that only seven states and the District
of Columbia do not direct forfeiture proceeds to law enforcement and that all federal forfeiture proceeds are
directed to law enforcement).
24. See Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law
Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2405–06 (2018) (citing a national study that found over sixty percent of
surveyed agencies relied on forfeiture proceeds for their budgets).
25. Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 12.
26. See Rulli, supra note 13, at 91 (“Although CAFRA does not attempt to reform criminal forfeiture,
it does attempt to encourage greater use of criminal forfeiture as an alternative to civil forfeiture.”).
27. See infra pp. 130–37.
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professional responsibility rules that prohibit the use of contingency fees in
criminal cases and question why the same ethical considerations should not
apply explicitly to quasi-criminal cases, such as civil forfeiture, where private
property is punitively forfeited in the name of the sovereign. To examine this
question more closely, this Article looks at Indiana’s practice of permitting
contingency fees in civil forfeiture cases and examines court data in civil
forfeiture cases prosecuted by government prosecutors and compares it to
forfeiture cases prosecuted by a private attorney on a contingency-fee basis.
The comparative data raises troubling questions that merit further study and
scrutiny by the state attorney general and state legislature. Based upon this
review, the Article calls upon the American Bar Association to amend its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to prohibit explicitly the use of contingency fees in
the prosecution of civil forfeiture cases and urges courts to refuse to enforce
contingency fee contracts in civil forfeiture cases on the basis that they violate
public policy. Finally, as the state of Georgia has already done in response to its
own disturbing experience, 28 the Indiana legislature should prohibit the use of
contingency fees when prosecuting civil forfeiture cases.
I. SYSTEMIC FORFEITURE ABUSE
The strong profit motive embedded in civil forfeiture laws coupled with a
paucity of legal protections for property owners have resulted in an explosion
of civil forfeiture abuses. For many years, the public was unaware of these
abuses as they were largely hidden from view. 29 However, through a series of
investigative studies and national reporting, the repeated victimization of
innocent property owners has been exposed. 30 These abusive practices target
cash carried by unsuspecting motorists on highways and shamelessly snatch cars
and homes of the poor, even when owners are never charged with a crime.
While abuses are now widely reported, this Article highlights several examples
to demonstrate the severity of the problem.
The small town of Tenaha, Texas, is now legendary for civil forfeiture abuse
on the highways. In 2007, the town was ground zero for a drug interdiction

28. See infra p. 136.
29. See Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 7.
30. See, e.g., Balko, supra note 18; Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken (detailing how state laws “designed to go after
high-flying crime lords are routinely targeting the workaday homes, cars, cash savings, and other belongings
of innocent people who are never charged with a crime”); Anna Lee et al., Taken: How Police Departments Make
Millions by Seizing Property, GREENVILLE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/indepth/news/taken/2019/01/27/civil-forfeiture-south-carolina-police-property-seizures-taken-exclusiveinvestigation/2457838002.
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program of the Tenaha Police Department. 31 Under the program, Tenaha
officials pulled over predominantly Black and Latinx motorists for minor traffic
violations in pursuit of any evidence of drug trafficking. 32 These stops led to
the seizure of cash, jewelry, electronics, and vehicles, often without any
evidence of drug activity. 33
Jennifer Boatright, her two young sons, and her boyfriend, Ron Henderson,
were driving through the town of Tenaha, Texas when they were pulled over
by a local officer. 34 The officer asked if they knew that they had been driving in
the left lane without passing another vehicle for a half a mile. 35 A consensual
search of the car led to the finding of a glass pipe and $6,000 in cash. The officer
and district attorney coerced the couple to sign a waiver to hand over the cash,
threatening felony prosecution or even the removal of their kids from their
custody. 36 Ultimately, Boatright, Henderson, and other victims of Tenaha’s
highway interdiction program filed a class-action lawsuit against the city in
which they alleged an abusive system that defied any law-enforcement
purpose. 37 After the court granted class certification, the case settled, with
Tenaha officials agreeing to policy changes to curb such abusive practices. 38
Highway interdiction programs routinely use minor traffic infractions as a
pretext for vehicle stops. These stops often do not result in criminal charges,
but they do result in the government’s seizure of cash, contractual waivers of
owners’ rights, and threats of incarceration or even the removal of children
from families. 39 After making a traffic stop, police often search the vehicle with
consent purportedly obtained from an intimidated driver under duress. If cash
is found during the search, police may present motorists with a cash-for-freedom
waiver: surrender permanently your property immediately on the spot or face
serious consequences. 40 Under such coercive conditions, many motorists sign
31. This interdiction program was led by Barry Washington, a Tenaha Police Officer. Stillman, supra
note 30.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. In the case of Jennifer Boatright and Ron Henderson, the evidence allegedly pointing to drug
trafficking was that they were driving from Houston, “a known point for distribution of illegal narcotics,” to
Linden, Texas (where Henderson was from), “a known place to receive illegal narcotics.” Id. The police also
claimed that their children’s presence in the car could have been strategic to distract police as decoys. Id.
37. Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 178 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
38. The lawsuit revealed that seized forfeited property funded such things as Halloween costumes, a
popcorn machine, a $1,000 donation to a church the District Attorney considered to be important to her
reelection, and $40,000 in bonuses to Officer Barry Washington, who ran the interdiction program. Stillman,
supra note 30.
39. See Marian R. Williams et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, 2010 INST. FOR JUST.
15–17.
40. See Note, supra note 24, at 2391. See also Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Asset Seizures Fuel Police Spending,
WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/assetseizures-fuel-police-spending (“In September, The Post reported that police across the country became more
aggressive in their use of federal civil asset forfeiture laws after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Officials

(DO NOT DELETE)

540

3/23/2021 12:43 AM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3:531

waivers to their property because they see no other option. 41 Few question why
the police come armed with contractual waivers or who prepared these legal
documents for this specific use.
The Tenaha highway interdiction program was not an outlier. In South
Carolina, law enforcement created their own interagency highway interdiction
program called Operation Rolling Thunder that lasted over a decade. 42 Once a
year, local, state, and federal agencies collaborated in multiday sting operations
on highways I-85 and I-26 in Spartanburg and Cherokee counties. During each
operation, officers pulled vehicles over for minor traffic infractions so that they
could conduct searches and potentially seize property. After such an operation,
the agencies petitioned for forfeiture and divided up the assets among
themselves. Officers who seized the most property were acknowledged with
awards. 43 One deputy involved in the operation told a news organization that
“[n]early everyone does something illegal if you follow them long enough.” 44
The Greenville News conducted a three-year investigation of civil forfeiture
operations known as Rolling Thunder in South Carolina that was published in
2019. 45 This study found that the program was co-opted by local authorities as
a steady revenue stream, resulting in significant racial disparities without a
connection to fighting crime. The study noted that Black men comprised only
13% of South Carolina’s population but 65% of the victims of civil forfeiture. 46
One-fifth of civil forfeiture victims were not charged with a crime or arrested;
another one-fifth who were charged were not convicted. 47 Fifty-five percent of
the time, police seized cash in amounts less than $1,000, making it economically

at Justice and the Department of Homeland Security encouraged a technique known as highway interdiction
to help in the fight against drugs and terror. There have been 61,998 cash seizures on highways and elsewhere
since 9/11 without search warrants or indictments and processed through the Equitable Sharing Program,
according to an analysis of Justice data obtained by The Post.” (citation omitted)).
41. The Washington Post published an extensive series on civil forfeiture in 2014. This reporting
documented aggressive policing practices in highway interdictions that resulted in the seizure of hundreds of
millions of dollars in cash from motorists and passengers not charged with a crime. Property owners were
required to fight lengthy court battles to prove that the possessions were lawfully acquired in order to get
their property back. While only one out of six property seizures resulted in a legal challenge, when a challenge
did occur the government voluntarily returned seized cash in 41% of the cases. Michael Sallah et al., Stop and
Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize.
42. Nathaniel Cary, Inside Look: How SC Cops Swarm I-85 and I-26, Looking for ‘Bad Guys,’ GREENVILLE
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/in-depth/news/2019/02/03/operation-rollingthunder-sc-civil-forfeiture-interstate-95-26/2458314002.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Nathaniel Cary & Mike Ellis, 65% of Cash Seized by SC Police Comes from Black Men. Experts Blame
Racism., GREENVILLE NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/taken/2019/01
/27/south-carolina-racism-blamed-civil-forfeiture-black-men-taken-exclusive-investigation/2459039002.
47. Cary, supra note 42.
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infeasible to hire legal help. 48 For property owners too poor to afford counsel,
there was no right to counsel and thus no available legal help. Ninety-five
percent of forfeiture proceeds went to law enforcement with only 5% directed
to the state’s general fund. 49 As a result, forfeiture profits amounted to
approximately 12% of annual operating budgets of participating
law-enforcement agencies. 50
The modern story of civil forfeiture is replete with similar abusive practices
perpetrated by law enforcement on the nation’s highways. In LaSalle County,
Illinois, the state’s attorney created his own police force called the LaSalle
County State’s Attorney Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Unit. 51 After being sworn
in as special investigators, veteran state troopers hired for SAFE were deployed
to Interstate 80 to engage in motorist stops. 52 After stopping a driver, an officer
would alert a canine unit to sniff the car. 53 Over four years, the unit seized a
total of $1.7 million, with almost half of all forfeiture cases not connected to a
criminal charge. 54 The funds derived from forfeitures covered the salaries of
officers, expenses, vehicles, weapons, and nearly $100,000 to travel to
conferences, including two trips to Las Vegas. 55 The SAFE unit was finally
disbanded in 2017 after the Illinois Supreme Court found the unit to be an
illegal use of prosecutorial authority. 56 The LaSalle County state’s attorney in
charge of the program faced criminal charges for misconduct and
misappropriating public funds after he allegedly spent asset forfeiture funds on
an SUV, Wi-Fi service for his home, and for local youth sports programs. 57
Unfortunately, many states share in similar predatory stories. In Michigan,
a study found that more than 700 innocent people had their assets forfeited in
2016 alone. 58 During that year, 523 individuals had their cash, cars, and other
48. Lee et al., supra note 30.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Nick Sibilla, Inst. for Just., Prosecutor Can’t Create Drug Squad to Seize Cash from Innocent Drivers,
Illinois Supreme Court Rules, FORBES (July 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/
07/17/prosecutor-cant-create-drug-squad-to-seize-cash-from-innocent-drivers-illinois-supreme-court-rules
/#6e33385777fd.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. On June 29, 2017, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in People v. Ringland, 89 N.E.3d 735 (Ill. 2017),
that there was no authority for LaSalle County State’s Attorney Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Unit, which
confiscated more than $1.7 million from drivers. The SAFE Unit operated from 2011 through 2015 and
patrolled Interstate 80 in Illinois. Veteran state troopers were sworn in as “special investigators” to stop and
arrest people for drug offenses (mostly marijuana). The agency then filed civil forfeiture cases, even though
almost half were not tied to a criminal charge. See Sibilla, supra note 51.
57. See C.J. Ciaramella, Manhattan D.A. Spent $250K in Asset Forfeiture Funds on Fine Dining and Luxurious
Travel, REASON (Apr. 4, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/04/manhattan-da-spent-250k-in-asset-forfeit.
58. See Jarrett Skorup, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Is Sweeping the Nation, HILL, (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/376961-civil-asset-forfeiture-reform-is-sweeping-the-nation.
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property taken without any criminal charges filed against them, while another
196 individuals were charged, but found innocent, of criminal activity. 59 Behind
each such story was an insatiable drive for revenue.
The Washington Post published an extensive series on police seizures and
forfeitures in 2014 that focused on the federal government’s adoption of state
forfeitures. 60 The series documented aggressive policing practices in highway
interdiction programs resulting in the seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars
in cash from motorists and passengers not charged with a crime. 61 As a result,
property owners were required to fight lengthy court battles to prove that their
possessions were lawfully acquired to get their property back. 62 Behind the
scenes, police employed private training companies, such as Black Asphalt and
Desert Snow, to train them on how to seize even greater amounts of cash on
the nation’s highways. These training programs underscored the
revenue-seeking purpose of civil forfeiture despite public claims of fighting
crime. 63
This underlying drive for profit led prosecutors in Philadelphia to seize
hundreds of homes owned primarily by low-income families and people of
color. Over a twelve-year period from 2002 through 2014, Philadelphia
prosecutors forfeited 1,248 homes. 64 Many of these homes were owned by
aging parents whose adult children (or grandchildren) allegedly sold small
amounts of low-level drugs, usually marijuana, from or near their homes. These
homes were overwhelmingly located in communities of color with parents
usually not charged with any wrongdoing. 65 As disturbing as these cold numbers
are, they barely convey the grievous harm felt by families when the pursuit of
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., O’Harrow et al., supra note 40; Sallah et al., supra note 41. According to this study, the
federal government adopted $2.5 billion in cash seizures from state and local law-enforcement agencies
between 2001 and 2014, with roughly $1.7 billion returning to state and local law enforcement under the
federal equitable sharing program. Nick Sibilla, Inst. for Just., This Federal Program Lets Cops Seize Cash, Evade
State Laws and Keep over a Billion Dollars, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/institutefor
justice/2014/09/29/highway-cash-seizures-civil-forfeiture/?sh=62d92033561b.
61. Sallah et al., supra note 41.
62. See O’Harrow et al., supra note 40. Only one out of six property seizures were legally challenged,
but when a challenge did occur the government voluntarily returned seized cash in 41% of the cases. Sallah
et al., supra note 41.
63. See Shaila Dewan, Police Use Department Wish List When Deciding Which Assets to Seize, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/us/police-use-department-wish-list-whendeciding-which-assets-to-seize.html; see also Sallah et al., supra note 41; Rulli, supra note 15, at 1122 n.71 (“Many
law enforcement departments have come to rely heavily on proceeds from forfeitures, with several hundred
leaning on forfeiture revenues to account for 20% or more of their annual budgets between 2008 and 2014.”).
64. Philadelphia’s Civil Forfeiture Machine Facts and Figures, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/philadelphiafacts-and-figures (last modified Jan. 1, 2020). In addition to forfeiting 1,248 homes, Philadelphia prosecutors
also forfeited 3,531 vehicles and over $50 million in cash during this same ten-year period. Id.
65. SB 869 Proposed Reforms to the Civil System of Asset Forfeiture in PA: Hearing on SB 869 Before the Sen.
Judiciary Comm., 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. 11 (Pa. 2015) (statement of Louis S. Rulli, Practice Professor of
Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
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profit overrides a solemn obligation to serve justice. The following two
Philadelphia home forfeiture cases provide a brief window into that harm.
Mary and Leon Adams, an African-American couple residing in West
Philadelphia, owned their home for over forty-five years when police seized it
in 2012. 66 A month earlier, their adult son was arrested for allegedly selling three
packets of marijuana for twenty dollars each to a confidential police informant
on the porch of their home. 67 At ages sixty-eight and seventy respectively, the
Adams couple faced the loss of their home without ever being charged with a
crime. 68 Neither had ever been involved with the law before. 69 Now, in
retirement, they faced the threat of losing their family home to civil forfeiture
with no prospect of where they would go. 70
It did not matter to prosecutors that the Adams couple were upstanding
members of the community. Mrs. Adams was a former saleswoman and block
captain in her neighborhood; Mr. Adams was a retired shipbuilder who was
battling pancreatic cancer. 71 Mrs. Adams, who was working part-time to pay the
bills and help her husband, stated, “With [the seizure] hanging over our head,
it’s devastating.” 72 Fortunately, Mr. and Mrs. Adams obtained free legal help
from a law school clinic and after more than two years of litigation and national
attention highlighted in the New Yorker magazine, the prosecutor’s office
withdrew the forfeiture petition prior to trial. 73
Elizabeth Young is an elderly, African-American homeowner who
purchased her Philadelphia home in the 1970s and worked for Amtrak for more
than twenty-five years. 74 She retired in 1995, and at age seventy, after her
husband’s death, she remained in her West Philadelphia home while being
active in her church. As her health began to fail, she purchased a used Chevrolet
Venture for transport to her medical appointments. 75 At this time, Ms. Young’s
adult son of almost fifty years of age came to live with her to assist her with her
medical appointments and to help raise two grandchildren who resided in her
home.
In 2011, Ms. Young’s adult son was arrested for selling several small packets
of marijuana for twenty dollars each to confidential informants assisting police

66. Stillman, supra note 30.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mary and Leon Adams were represented by the author of this Article along with law students
enrolled in the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s Civil Practice Clinic.
74. Notes of Testimony at 56–57, 59, Commonwealth v. 416 S. 62nd St., No. CP–51–MD–0002972–
2010 (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cty. May 1, 2012) (on file with author).
75. Id. at 60, 72–73.
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narcotics officers. 76 Each marijuana sale was initiated by a phone call from a
confidential informant working with the police to Ms. Young’s son on his cell
phone (not on a house phone), offering to buy marijuana and arranging to meet
him at or near his mother’s residence. After purchasing marijuana and then
arresting her son for these drug offenses, 77 prosecutors filed a civil forfeiture
petition against Ms. Young’s home and car, alleging that each had facilitated her
son’s marijuana sales. Ms. Young was not charged with a crime and was
certainly not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing.
While Ms. Young was fortunate to obtain pro bono legal help from a large
Philadelphia law firm, the court rejected her defenses at trial. 78 At age seventy
and innocent of any criminal wrongdoing, Ms. Young lost both her home and
car to the state. She and her grandchildren were physically thrown out of their
home. This is what civil forfeiture looks like in poor and minority
neighborhoods. 79
The widespread use of civil forfeiture against innocent property owners has
caused many to question whether civil forfeiture has strayed too far from its
intended purpose and has become a grab for revenue rather than a tool to
protect public safety. 80 In Leonard v. Texas, Justice Thomas voiced this concern
when he suggested that current forfeiture practices may not comport with the
Due Process Clause and the historical justification for civil forfeiture. 81 Noting
that civil forfeiture had become “widespread and highly profitable” in recent
decades, Justice Thomas stated:

76. Id. at 16–22.
77. The criminal prosecution resulted in a conviction and incarceration for Young’s son, but no fine
was imposed (other than standard court costs). Docket, Commonwealth v. Graham, No. CP-51-CR-00006432010, (Ct. C.P. Phila. Cnty. Jan. 15, 2010).
78. Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 160–62 (Pa. 2017).
79. After several years of appeals, Ms. Young won her appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court where
her case established groundbreaking precedent on the proper application of the Excessive Fines Clause of
the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions to civil forfeiture cases. See id. at 158–59. A more detailed description
of both the Adams and Young cases can be found in a previous article of the author. See Rulli, supra note 15,
at 1134–38. In addition, the Institute for Justice challenged abusive forfeiture practices in Philadelphia in a
federal class action lawsuit that resulted in a favorable class-wide settlement reforming abusive city practices.
See Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 14-4687 (E.D. Pa.); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia,
103 F. Supp. 3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (denying the City of Philadelphia’s motion to dismiss).
80. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 15, at 1128–29 (noting that many forfeitures are for small amounts of cash
that people are not willing to spend months fighting to retrieve). The Institute for Justice accumulated
forfeiture data from ten states in 2012, showing that the median value of forfeited property ranged from $451
in Minnesota to $2,048 in Utah. Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 12. In Philadelphia between 2011 and 2013,
more than half of cash-only forfeiture cases involved less than $192. For property worth less than $200, just
3% of owners fought to retrieve their goods. See also Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct 682, 689 (2019) (No. 17-1091)
(“Perhaps because they are politically easier to impose than generally applicable taxes, state and local
governments nationwide increasingly depend heavily on fines and fees as a source of general revenue”).
81. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017), denying cert. to $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State,
No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536, at *3 (Tex. App. July 16, 2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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This system—where police can seize property with limited judicial oversight
and retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled
abuses . . . . These forfeiture operations frequently target the poor and other
groups least able to defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings. Perversely,
these same groups are often the most burdened by forfeiture. They are more
likely to use cash than alternative forms of payment, like credit cards, which
may be less susceptible to forfeiture. And they are more likely to suffer in their
daily lives while they litigate for the return of a critical item of property, such
as a car or a home. 82

Similarly, in Timbs v. Indiana, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the
imposition of excessive fines may carry a political motive that undermines other
constitutional rights or may be used as “a source of revenue” that is “out of
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence.” 83 Justice Ginsburg
cautioned that unlike other forms of punishment that impose costs upon a state,
fines are a source of revenue. 84
As abusive forfeiture practices have become increasingly exposed to the
public, a growing number of states have enacted legislative reforms. Since 2014,
at least thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have amended their civil
forfeiture laws. Three states have abolished civil forfeiture entirely. 85 Some
states have heightened the government’s burden of proof to clear and
convincing evidence, such as Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, while others have
shifted the burden of proof from the property owner to the government when
claims of innocent ownership are raised. 86 Other states now require a criminal
conviction before property may be forfeited, 87 while others, such as Wyoming
and Virginia, have banned roadside waivers at traffic stops and many other
states have required enhanced reporting requirements following forfeitures. 88
Additionally, some states have prohibited equitable sharing with federal
authorities in an attempt to prevent local police from evading state reforms. 89
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct 682, 689 (2019) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause).
84. Id. at 689 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n.9 (1991)) (“[I]t
makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit.”).
85. North Carolina, New Mexico, and Nebraska have abolished civil forfeiture. However, this does
not mean that civil forfeiture does not occur in these states. For example, while North Carolina has abolished
civil forfeiture and now requires that state forfeitures proceed criminally, federal and state authorities engage
in equitable sharing that results in more than $11 million each year to state authorities for their participation
in the equitable sharing program. Equitable sharing allows states with restrictive laws to bypass reforms
enacted by state legislatures. See Kelly, supra note 15, at 11.
86. At least thirteen states have enacted burden of proof reforms, including California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See id.
87. More than fifteen states now require a criminal conviction, including Connecticut, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.
88. Approximately twenty-five states have enhanced reporting requirements, including Arizona,
Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Id.
89. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. In equitable sharing, local law-enforcement agencies call upon
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While these reforms are important steps in restraining civil forfeiture’s
overreaching, no state has yet enacted a right to counsel for indigent property
owners, and most states still direct all, or most, forfeiture proceeds to law
enforcement with too little accountability or transparency. Unless civil
forfeiture’s profit motive is eliminated and the scales of justice are balanced in
obtaining access to legal help, these legislative reforms will not be enough to
eliminate systemic abuses that plague civil forfeiture and cause so much harm
to innocent Americans.
A. Civil Forfeiture’s Profit Motive
The undeniable truth is that civil forfeiture is highly profitable. 90 With
strong lobbies in Congress and in state capitals, law enforcement has positioned
itself to be the direct recipient of civil forfeiture proceeds. In this way, forfeiture
proceeds bypass general treasuries and evade meaningful public accountability
and decision-making. One key to curbing systemic abuse is to remove the
structural financial incentives that are embedded in civil forfeiture laws.
Current civil forfeiture laws divide loyalties by financially rewarding
prosecutorial offices for the forfeitures they obtain. This conflict of interest
distorts prosecutorial priorities and smacks of an appearance of impropriety
that undermines public confidence in the neutrality of law enforcement and the
fairness of courts. In addition, transparency is sorely lacking over such large
amounts of funds, leading to public skepticism and distrust. 91 A report by the
Institute for Justice (IJ) found that twenty-six states have little to no
transparency requirements for asset forfeiture. According to the IJ report,
fourteen states “do not appear to require any form of property tracking, leaving
in doubt even such basic questions as what was seized and how much it was
the federal authorities to adopt local-originated forfeitures so that federal authorities may prosecute these
actions under federal law. In this way, local prosecutors bypass more restrictive state laws knowing that as
much as 80% of forfeiture proceeds will ultimately be returned to them upon the successful conclusion of
the case. Legitimate concerns for federalism are cast aside to maximize local profit. Moreover, a recent
empirical study of equitable sharing practices has called into doubt the frequent claim that civil forfeiture is
necessary to fight crime as opposed to simply raising revenue. Id.; see also Jefferson E. Holcomb et al., Civil
Asset Forfeiture Laws and Equitable Sharing Activity by the Police, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 101, 112–17
(2018) (finding in a 2018 study that states with more restraints were twice as likely to use adoption as those
states without such restrictions). Attorney General Eric Holder in the Obama Administration ended the
program in 2015, but Attorney General Jeff Sessions reinstated the program in 2017 during the Trump
Administration. Kelly, supra note 15, at 6.
90. See Note, supra note 24, at 2390 (“Forfeiture is profitable. While a lack of reporting requirements
makes it difficult to fully account for its revenues, the Justice and Treasury departments alone received nearly
$4.5 billion in forfeiture proceeds in 2014; individual states have taken in as much as $46 million in a single
year from the practice.”); see also Developments in the Law: Policing, supra note 5, at 1730–33. It is therefore
unsurprising that forfeiture is an attractive tool for law enforcement.
91. See Balko, supra note 18 (describing how difficult it is to get and make sense of the data and how
law enforcement routinely resists FOIA and right-to-know requests).
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worth, who seized it, when it was seized, where it was seized, and why it was
seized.” 92 As investigative journalists quickly learn, formal information
requests, and sometimes litigation, are needed to compel the release of even
basic information. 93 Meanwhile, prosecutors and police have openly espoused
a mantra of “forfeit, forfeit, forfeit,” 94 especially as salaries, bonuses, and office
budgets have increasingly become dependent on forfeiture proceeds. One
scholar has suggested that forfeiture may be governed not by justice, but by
“department wish lists.” 95
Several jurisdictions have responded by abolishing civil forfeiture entirely
or by redirecting forfeiture proceeds to a general fund. For example, North
Carolina, New Mexico, and Nebraska have abolished civil forfeiture, while New
Hampshire and the District of Columbia redirect forfeiture proceeds to a
general fund that provides legislators with decision-making authority over the
use of the proceeds. 96 Until more states abolish civil forfeiture or, at a
92. Angela C. Erickson et al., Forfeiture Transparency & Accountability, INST. FOR JUST. (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://ij.org/report/forfeiture-transparency-accountability.
93. See Pennsylvania Forfeiture FOIA, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/pa-forfeiture-foia (last visited
Feb. 9, 2021) (“When Carter appealed the DA’s denial of his request to Pennsylvania’s Office of Open
Records, it concluded that the records should be public under the RTKL. But now the Lancaster District
Attorney is appealing that decision in court. Carter and LNP are now teaming with the Institute for Justice
to make forfeiture records in Lancaster County and the neighboring Berks County available to the public.”);
see also Jocelyn Brumbaugh, ‘Investigatory Information’ at Issue: Cambria Judge Orders DA’s Financial Records
Concerning Drug Forfeiture Accounts Be Made Public, TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT (Dec. 2, 2018),
https://www.tribdem.com/news/investigatory-information-at-issue-cambria-judge-orders-da-s-financial/
article_92ddcf14-f5e9-11e8-8787-83e36ffcb74a.html (detailing the ruling by Cambria County President Judge
directing the county district attorney to release financial records concerning drug forfeiture funds handled by
her office following allegations that forfeiture funds were spent on a laptop, restaurant meals, a country club
membership, and flowers). New York City is currently facing a class action by the Bronx Defenders for failing
to turn over documents requested under freedom of information laws about how it tracks assets seized by
the New York Police Department. Although the Bronx Defenders requested forty documents, the NYPD
turned over just two accounting summaries and a copy of the NYPD patrol guide. But those documents
already showed the NYPD may be sitting on millions of dollars in forfeiture funds. See Matt Powers, Judge
Calls Out NYPD’s Deceptive Forfeiture Record Keeping, INST. FOR JUST. (May 25, 2017), https://ij.org/judge-callsnypds-deceptive-forfeiture-record-keeping; Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s Application for
a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, Bronx Defs. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t,
2017 NYLJ LEXIS 1412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2017) (No. 156520/2016).
94. See Erik Grant Luna, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court’s Constitutional House of Cards, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 409, 433 (1997); see also Stephen Labaton, Seized Property in Crime Cases Causes Concern, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/31/us/seized-property-in-crime-cases-causesconcern.html (quoting former Justice Department chief Michael Zeldin as saying that the Department “had
a situation in which the desire to deposit money into the asset forfeiture fund became the reason for being
of forfeiture, eclipsing in certain measure the desire to effect fair enforcement of the laws as a matter of pure
law enforcement objectives”).
95. Note, supra note 24, at 2392 (quoting Shaila Dewan, Police Use Department Wish List When Deciding
Which Assets to Seize, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/us/police-usedepartment-wish-list-when-deciding-which-assets-to-seize.html). In addition, a 2010 survey of 800 police
departments found that nearly 40% said that civil forfeiture proceeds were a “necessary budget supplement.”
Emma Coleman, Civil Asset Forfeiture Under New Scrutiny Amid Calls for Police Reform, ROUTE FIFTY (July 14,
2020), https://www.route-fifty.com/public-safety/2020/07/civil-asset-forfeiture-reform/166868 (citing
Marian R. Williams et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Forfeiture, 2010 INST. FOR JUST.).
96. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, supra note 21.
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minimum, remove its profit incentive, we can expect widespread abuses to
persist. Unfortunately, Indiana has made matters worse by authorizing private
attorneys to prosecute civil forfeiture cases and to be compensated by
contingency fees.
II. CONTINGENCY FEES
A contingency fee is a contractual means by which a client obtains legal
services and is not obligated to pay the lawyer until a particular goal is
achieved. 97 It is popularly marketed to the public under the banner of “no
recovery, no fee.” 98 Typically, a lawyer agrees to accept a fixed percentage (often
one-third) of the ultimate financial recovery in the case. If the case is not won,
the client is not required to pay the attorney for work performed. 99 Lawyers
generally accept a contingency fee in cases where money is claimed, most often
in personal injury or workers’ compensation cases. 100 Contingency fees
accomplish several important purposes: they expand access to courts to assert
rights for those who cannot afford counsel, they provide incentive to a lawyer
to seek the client’s success in meritorious claims, and they share the risk of loss
based upon the lawyer’s assessment and ability to absorb loss when handling
multiple cases on contingencies. 101
Historically, contingent fees were considered unethical and illegal. 102 Both
the English rule and the early American rule regarded contingent fee
arrangements as “champertous and therefore improper.” 103 In 1908, the ABA
adopted thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics that did not ban contingent
fees in criminal cases but instead advised that permissible contingency fees
97. Contingency Fee, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/contingency-fee (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
98. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a contingent fee to be “a fee stipulated to be paid to an attorney
for his services in conducting a suit or other forensic proceeding only in case he wins it; it may be a percentage
of the amount recovered.” Contingent Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); see also No Fee If No
Recovery: What Does This Mean?, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/no-fee-no-recoverymean (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) (“Because contingent fee arrangements mean that the attorney only gets paid
when money is at stake that means that contingency fee arrangements are usually only practical when damages
are being pursued, most often in personal injury or workers [sic] compensation cases. The actual contingency
fee will vary from attorney to attorney, but generally it ranges between 25–40% of the settlement amount.”).
99. See When You Need a Lawyer, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/public_education/resources/law_issues_for_consumers/lawyerfees_contingent.
100. Id.
101. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(c)–(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
102. See Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note, Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense
Approach to Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1701–02 (2001) (detailing evolving arguments that
contingent fees are both unethical and illegal, and noting that early cases focused on whether they were legally
enforceable, while in later ones, objections were raised in habeas corpus petitions claiming ineffective legal
counsel).
103. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 86-1521 (1986).
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should be examined under the supervision of a court to protect clients. 104 As
the Canons grew in number 105 and were superseded in 1969 by the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, the ABA instructed that a contingent fee, when
permitted by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
and always subject to the supervision of the Court. 106
In 1965, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics was asked to provide
guidance on whether a criminal defense lawyer could ethically charge a
contingency fee. 107 The Committee issued an informal opinion advising that the
Canon’s reasonableness standard applied to criminal cases if contingent fees
were deemed lawful in criminal cases. 108 Since the ABA’s Professional Ethics
Committee does not pass on questions of law, it did not opine on whether a
contingent fee in criminal cases was lawful. Instead, the Committee
recommended that the lawyer consult a report on contingency fees issued
previously by the American Bar Foundation. 109 On this question, the
Foundation report stated:
The third area of practice in which the use of the contingent fee is generally
considered to be prohibited is the prosecution and defense of criminal cases.
However, there are so few cases, and these are predominantly old, that it is
doubtful that there can be said to be any current law on the subject . . . . In
the absence of cases on the validity of contingent fees for defense attorneys,
it is necessary to rely on the consensus among commentators that such a fee
is void as against public policy. 110

The ABA Foundation report specifically referenced a 1920 case in which
the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to enforce a contingent fee agreement
that provided a lawyer assisting a prosecuting attorney with a larger fee if the
defendant was convicted. The court found this fee arrangement to be violative
of public policy because “it tended to bring about [a] conviction regardless of
the prosecutor’s primary duty to see that justice was done.” 111
104. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908).
105. The canons grew to a total of forty-seven between 1908 and 1969.
106. Canon 13 stated: “Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of
the Court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.” Id.
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. A337 (1965). Specifically, the inquiring lawyer
sought ethical guidance on whether he could charge a set fee if the criminal case was won, with no fee if the
case was lost, or in the alternative whether the lawyer could charge a set retainer fee, with additional
compensation if the defense was successful. Id.
108. See id.
109. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 832 (1965) (citing F. B. MACKINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 52 (1964)).
110. MACKINNON, supra note 109 (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. (citing Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730 (N.M. 1920)). The MacKinnon text also cites the Basic
California Practice Handbook, which recommends that “[i]n criminal practice, it is unethical to have a fee
contingent upon a specific result: acquittal, probation, fine, or minimum term of punishment . . . . Fee setting
in a criminal case should be on the basis of the time necessary to render proper service.” Id. at 52 (citing Basic
California Practice Handbook 388 (1959)).
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In the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, first adopted in 1969, the ABA
explicitly banned contingent fees when representing a defendant in a criminal
case. 112 While the Model Code 113 recognized the importance of allowing
contingency fees in certain types of civil cases to expand access to legal help, 114
it prohibited such fees in criminal matters. Disciplinary Rule 2-106 prohibited
excessive attorney’s fees in general and also expressly banned contingency-fee
agreements when representing a defendant in a criminal case. 115 The disciplinary
rule relied in part upon a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that noted that
contingent fees in criminal cases posed a special concern requiring stricter
limitations because of the “danger of corrupting justice.” 116 Contingent fees are
prohibited in criminal cases because they “may present the risk of giving the
lawyer an interest that is in conflict either with the client’s interests or with
important public interests.” 117 For similar reasons, prosecutors are required to
disqualify themselves from any proceedings in which they have a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy. 118

112. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 2-106(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). DR 2-106(C) prohibited “a
contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.” Before the adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, ethical rules were defined by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics (last amended in
1963) and replaced by the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See also Peter Lushing, The Fall
and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 500 (1992).
113. The Model Code was organized into canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules. The
canons were a general directive to lawyers about the law of professional responsibility, while ethical
considerations were more detailed in discussing factual situations arising under each canon. Ethical
considerations were aspirational, while disciplinary rules were requirements that lawyers had to follow to
avoid disciplinary action. See Preface to MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Ethical
Consideration 2-20 noted that contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted
to enforce claims based on the fact that they are often the “only practical means by which one having a claim
against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute
his claim,” and the successful prosecution of the claim produces a res from which fees can be obtained.
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 2-20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
114. Although ethical canons also expressed concern about a lawyer acquiring a proprietary interest in
the cause of his client or otherwise becoming financially interested in the outcome of the client’s litigation,
they justified a contingent fee arrangement in many civil cases on the basis that it may be the “only means by
which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice.” MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 5-7 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1980).
115. See MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 2-106(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); see also MODEL CODE OF
PRO. RESP. DR 5-103(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (permitting a lawyer to contract with a client for a
reasonable contingent fee in a civil case).
116. Peyton v. Margiotti, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. 1959) (“A bargain to conduct a criminal case . . . in
consideration of a promise of a fee contingent on success is illegal . . . .” (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 542 (AM. L. INST. 1932))).
117. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 93-373 (1993) (holding that the Model Rules
do not prohibit contingent fee agreements for representation of defendants in civil cases based on the amount
of money saved a client, assuming it is reasonable). The opinion states that in criminal representation
contingent fees may promote unscrupulous representation or discourage plea bargaining and, as a practical
matter, present difficult issues of what constitutes a successful outcome. Id.
118. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Pro. Resp., C-64 n.10; Ian T. Ramsey & Vonda F. Kirby, Contingency Fee Counsel in Forfeiture Proceedings, GAMING
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Over time, contingent fees in some types of civil cases obtained acceptance
as a means of expanding greater public access to legal help and to the courts, 119
as long as the lawyer did not acquire a proprietary interest in the client’s cause
of action. 120 Many jurisdictions still prohibit the use of contingency fees in
situations that conflict with, or appear to conflict with, the integrity of public
institutions. For example, state and local governments generally prohibit
payment of contingency fees to lobbyists for their efforts to influence
legislation. 121 This ban reflects serious concerns that lobbyists may overreach,
or at least create unfavorable appearances of overreaching, that will taint the
integrity of the legislative process. In fact, one state not only makes contingency
payments to lobbyists illegal but also makes any contingency fees paid to a
lobbyist forfeitable to the state. 122
To protect against lawyer overreaching, contingency fees are governed by
stricter ethical requirements than fees paid on an hourly or fixed basis. The
ABA’s Model Rules require that contingency fees be reasonable and not clearly
excessive. 123 Lawyers must document contingent fee arrangements with
clients. 124 Some states require enhanced notice of contingency fees to clients,
L. MINEFIELD C-55 (Feb. 23, 2010) (citing John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 516–21 (1994)).
119. See Godfrey, supra note 102, at 1702 (citing Lushing, supra note 112, at 503).
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 86-1521 n.1 (1986).
121. Most states prohibit contingency fees to lobbyists. However, a handful of states, including
Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Wyoming, do not. Lobbying Contingency Fees in the
U.S.A., ASS’N ACCREDITED PUB. POL’Y ADVOCS. TO EUR. UNION (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.aalep.eu/
lobbying-contingency-fees-usa; see also Robert Wechsler, Contingency Fees and Lobbying and Contracting with
Attorneys General, CITY ETHICS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.cityethics.org/content/contingency-fees-andlobbying-and-contracting-attorneys-general (quoting two state attorneys general as saying that “[f]arming out
the police powers of the state to a private firm with a profit incentive is a very, very bad thing” and that the
practice “seriously threatens the perception of integrity and professionalism of the office, as it raises the
question of whether attorneys are taking up these cases because they are important public matters, or they
are being driven more by potential for private financial gain”).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 120C-300 provides as follows:
Contingency fees prohibited.
(a) No individual shall act as a lobbyist and receive payment for lobbying that is dependent upon
the result or outcome of any legislative or executive action.
(b) This section shall not apply to an individual doing business with the State who is engaged in
sales with respect to that business with the State whose regular remuneration agreement includes
commissions based on those sales. For purposes of this subsection, the term “regular
remuneration” means any money, thing of value, or economic benefit conferred on or received
by the individual in return for services rendered or to be rendered by that individual or another.
(c) Any payment to a lobbyist in violation of this section is subject to forfeiture and shall be paid
into the Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 120C-300 (West 2019).
123. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); MODEL CODE OF PRO.
RESP. DR 2-106A (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). There is a continuing debate about the propriety or wisdom of
contingent fees, with proponents arguing that they are needed to promote justice and access to courts while
opponents charge that they result in unwarranted and unmeritorious litigation. See ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 94-389 (1994).
124. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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impose greater specificity in contingency-contract provisions, place limits on
the division of fees, and prohibit client waivers of rights. 125
Model Rule 1.5 addresses contingency fees directly and prohibits lawyers
from accepting contingency fees in domestic relations and criminal cases. 126
Rule 1.5(d) provides that:
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. 127

All fifty states have adopted Model Rule 1.5(d)’s subject-matter
prohibitions on contingency fees with only minor changes. 128

125. These variations are detailed in the ABA’s table showing state rule provisions compared to the
model rules. CPR Pol’y Implementation Comm., Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Dec. 11, 2018).
126. While the Model Rules prohibit contingency fees in both domestic relations and criminal cases,
this Article addresses only the prohibition applicable to criminal cases. Notably, contingency fees in criminal
cases have long been prohibited by courts. See, e.g., Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730, 732 (N.M. 1920) (“To permit
and sanction the appearance on behalf of the state of a private prosecutor, vitally interested personally in
securing the conviction of the accused . . . in order that the private purse of the prosecutor may be fattened,
is abhorrent to the sense of justice . . . .”); Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207, 208 (1864) (barring
contingent fees for supporting prosecution, which the court considers a civic duty).
127. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
128. To the extent that states have modified Model Rule 1.5(d)’s language, most changes relate to the
domestic relations prohibition. In those instances, some states have changed terminology in the rule to match
their own jurisdiction’s language and usage. For example, Connecticut replaced the word “divorce” with
“dissolution of marriage or civil union,” Missouri added “dissolution of the marriage” after the word
“divorce,” and Montana replaced the word “alimony” with “maintenance.” CONN. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.5.(d)(1) (1998); MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-1.5.(d)(1) (2020); MONT. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.5.(d)(1) (2003). Some states added child custody to the domestic relations prohibition (IND.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5.(d)(1) (2021); MD. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 19-301.5(d) (2016)), while
others clarified that the prohibition did not apply to post-judgment collection actions for support arrears (for
example, KY. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. SCR3.130(1.5)(d)(1) (2021) and IND. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 1.5.(d) (2021)). Still others, such as Kentucky, expanded the phrase “alimony or support” to include
“alimony, maintenance, support, or property settlement.” KY. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
SCR3.130(1.5)(d)(1) (2021). One state, New Hampshire, added to the domestic-relations prohibition efforts
to obtain any specific nonfinancial relief. N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5.(d)(1)(c). One notable
exception includes the District of Columbia, which eliminated entirely the prohibition on contingency fees
in domestic-relations matters without adopting a replacement provision. The seventh comment to DC Rule
1.5 states: “Contingent fees in domestic relations cases, while rarely justified, are not prohibited by Rule 1.5.
Contingent fees in such cases are permitted in order that lawyers may provide representation to clients who
might not otherwise be able to afford to contract for the payment of fees on a noncontingent basis.” D.C.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2009). Another exception includes North Carolina, which eliminated all
reference to the domestic-relations prohibition, replacing it with general language prohibiting “a contingent
fee in a civil case in which such a fee is prohibited by law.” See N.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2021).
Maine added a third category of prohibition restricting contingency fees on “any fee to administer an estate
in probate, the amount of which is based on a percentage of the value of the estate.” See ME. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.5(d)(3) (2020).
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Notably, the Model Rules say little about this prohibition in criminal cases;
the text of the rule simply prohibits a contingent fee for representing a
defendant in a criminal case. The rule does not provide guidance in an
explanatory comment nor does it define the types of matters that fall within the
overall criminal case category. 129 Interestingly, the rule does not explicitly state
that the ethical ban also applies to a prosecutor in a criminal case, presumably
because it is self-evident that a criminal prosecutor cannot be paid on such a
basis. Otherwise, it would certainly be very difficult to understand why ethical
rules would prohibit contingency fees for a criminal defense lawyer but not for
a criminal prosecutor.
The ethical prohibition on contingency fees in criminal cases reflects
concerns that a defense lawyer may be unwilling to properly counsel a client to
accept a favorable plea bargain or might fail to take steps at trial that would
result in a conviction of a lesser offense because financial incentives from
contingency fees would push the lawyer to seek an acquittal at trial. 130 This
conflict, actual or perceived, helps to explain why all fifty states and the District
of Columbia have adopted Model Rule 1.5(d)(2)’s prohibition on contingency
fees. 131 Moreover, when criminal defense lawyers have occasionally provided
129. The Model Rules offer no guidance in the text of Rule 1.5(d) or in the comment to the rule about
the prohibition on contingency fees in criminal cases.
130. Additionally, the ban reflects that there is no body of funds generated by a criminal case from
which a contingent fee could be obtained. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 41 (1989) (“[L]egal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.”).
131. See CPR Pol’y Implementation Comm., supra note 125. Some states have added to the prohibition.
For example, Wisconsin makes it unethical to use contingency fees in “any proceeding that could result in
deprivation of liberty.” Id. Wisconsin Rule 1.5(d) provides:
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee:
(1) in any action affecting the family, including but not limited to divorce, legal separation,
annulment, determination of paternity, setting of support and maintenance, setting of custody
and physical placement, property division, partition of marital property, termination of parental
rights and adoption, provided that nothing herein shall prohibit a contingent fee for the collection
of past due amounts of support or maintenance or property division.
(2) for representing a defendant in a criminal case or any proceeding that could result in
deprivation of liberty.
WIS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (2020). North Carolina’s version of Rule 1.5(d)(2) provides that a
lawyer may charge and collect a contingent fee for representation in a criminal or civil asset forfeiture
proceeding if not otherwise prohibited by law. N.C. RULES OF PRO CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (2021).
A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case; however, a lawyer may charge
and collect a contingent fee for representation in a criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceeding if
not otherwise prohibited by law; or
(2) a contingent fee in a civil case in which such a fee is prohibited by law.
Id. In addition, forfeiture under North Carolina law is only permitted when the owner of the property in
question has been convicted of a crime, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2.3 (West 2008). However, North Carolina is still subject to federal forfeiture laws, which only
require the government to prove that it is “more likely than not” that the property has criminal associations.
Finally, it is interesting that North Carolina has placed both civil and criminal forfeitures in the same category
when applying this prohibition, reflecting the similarities between the two when applying the prohibition. It
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representation on a fee contingent basis, their clients have sometimes later
sought habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a
claimed conflict of interest. 132
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 133 provides additional guidance
on the prohibition in criminal cases by stating that a lawyer may contract with
a client for a contingent fee that is reasonable, unless payment is contingent on
the “success in prosecuting or defending a criminal proceeding.” 134 The Restatement
concludes that a contingent fee for prosecuting a criminal case violates public
policy because a prosecutor may be tempted to seek conviction more than
justice, and in any event, the government does not need contingent fees to
obtain legal representation or to transfer the risk of loss. 135 The Restatement’s
position draws support from the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, which provide
that a prosecutor should avoid conflicts of interest regarding official duties and
not permit professional judgment or obligation to be affected by political,
financial, business, property, or personal interests. 136 This is necessary because
should also be noted that there is academic discussion about whether contingency-fee representation of
defendants in civil forfeiture cases should be permitted in ethical rules to expand access to counsel, especially
since there is no right to counsel in most civil forfeiture matters. This suggestion arguably finds support based
upon an interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, in
which the Court seemed to approve of contingency-fee arrangements when it held that attorneys’ fees owing
to defense counsel are subject to forfeiture, and the Court justified the harsh impact of its holding by
suggesting that some lawyers may be willing to provide representation on the basis that their fees will be paid
upon acquittal (and concerns about plea bargaining against the client’s interest to preserve a fee would
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 491 U.S. 617, 620 (1989).
132. See Godfrey, supra note 102, at 1701 n.16; see also United States ex rel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F.
Supp. 818, 823–24 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding a defense lawyer’s advice to his client—a woman accused of
murdering her husband—that she not accept a plea bargain to a lesser homicide charge constituted an
impermissible conflict of interest because the payment arrangement provided for payment of the lawyer’s fee
out of the deceased husband’s life insurance proceeds). Pennsylvania had a “slayer rule” at that time that only
permitted payment of insurance proceeds to an accused if she was acquitted. Id. at 820–21; see also United
States v. Magini, 973 F.2d 261, 264–65 (4th Cir. 1992) (endorsing the petitioner’s argument that his attorney’s
“private, pecuniary interest” in forfeitable assets led him to negotiate a higher sentence than he would have
recommended if he had been willing to include a forfeiture in the deal); State v. Labonville, 492 A.2d 1376,
1379 (N.H. 1985) (“An attorney should not defend a criminal defendant pursuant to a contingent fee
agreement because such an arrangement can create a conflict between the interests of the client and those of
the attorney.”); People v. Winkler, 523 N.E. 2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1988) (“The conflict between a client’s interest
in effective assistance of counsel and an attorney’s financial inducements to satisfy the contingent fee
qualifying terms creates an atmosphere for risky compromise of the client’s best interests on the gamble that
the contingency might produce a bonus to the attorney rather than justice to the client.”).
133. The Restatement, published by the American Law Institute in 2000, addresses contingency fees
in Section 35 of Chapter 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 (AM. L. INST.
2000).
134. Id. § 35(1)(a) (emphasis added). It also states in § 35(1)(b) that a contingency fee is prohibited in
a divorce proceeding or a proceeding concerning custody of a child. Id. at § 35(1)(b).
135. Id. § 35 cmt. f(ii); see also id. at § 97.
136. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(a), (f) (4th
ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourth
Edition. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice began in 1964 as a project of a Special Committee on
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice. The standards governing the prosecution function were
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prosecutors possess a dual role; they are responsible for obtaining convictions
of the guilty in criminal cases, but they also shoulder the responsibility to see
that no innocent person is prosecuted, convicted, or punished. 137 This dual
responsibility differs sharply from the obligation of a private advocate who
owes a duty of loyalty to the client and to the protection of that client’s interests
above all. 138
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct underscore the prosecutor’s special
responsibility to be a minister of justice and not simply an ordinary advocate. 139
This responsibility includes solemn “obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice . . . [and] that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence.” 140 For these reasons, a prosecutor is held to “a higher
standard of behavior” than defense counsel. 141 Moreover, a prosecutor has an
obligation to further the public interest. In return for these heightened
responsibilities, a prosecutor is cloaked with absolute immunity in recognition
of the public trust placed in this role that is essential to the proper functioning
of the criminal justice system. 142 For these reasons, a prosecutor’s role is “much
nearer that of a judicial officer than that of partisan advocate.” 143
To meet this solemn responsibility, prosecutors are prohibited from
representing the government in any matter in which they, their family, or their
last revised and approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1992. The criminal codes of many states have
been influenced by the ABA standards.
137. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV.
511, 543 (1994).
138. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“Loyalty and
independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”).
139. See id. at r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); see, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding
that an attorney for the state “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all”).
140. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
141. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis omitted).
142. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
143. Bessler, supra note 137, at 544 (citing CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1,
at 759 (1986)); see also MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 7-13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“The responsibility of
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.
This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint
in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during
trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual
client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the
accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.” (footnote omitted)); AM BAR ASS’N, supra note
136, § 3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not
merely to convict.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (“[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to
protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce
the rights of the public.”); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of
victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and
give those accused of crime a fair trial.”).
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business associates have any interest. 144 Accordingly, a prosecutor may not
participate in a case in which the prosecutor has a pecuniary interest in the
outcome, 145 and a prosecutor may be disqualified for a personal interest or
financial stake in the outcome of the criminal prosecution. 146 As Justice
Brennan noted in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 147 a case
involving claims of prosecutorial conflicts, an error is fundamental if it
undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding. 148
Dismissing a claim that there was no actual prejudice in that case, Justice
Brennan underscored that such an argument “misses the point . . . [as] ‘justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice,’ . . . and a prosecutor with conflicting
loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite.” 149
A. The Private Lawyer as Prosecutor
On occasion, law-enforcement agencies hire private lawyers to litigate on
the public’s behalf. State attorney-general offices sometimes engage a private
law firm to temporarily expand their resources to handle a complex case, bring
on special expertise, or obtain needed help during temporary periods of time. 150
In these instances, private counsel are often called “special assistants” and
perform specified litigation tasks enumerated by contract. Special assistants are
compensated on an hourly basis or for a flat amount that is set in relation to
salaried members of the office. In some states, however, this traditional form
of compensation has been replaced by contingency fees in which special
assistants assume a personal financial stake in the outcome of the cases they
handle on behalf of the public. 151
There is serious question as to whether private lawyers are constitutionally
permitted to prosecute criminal cases, regardless of the manner of payment.
Some states prohibit the practice, while others permit it as long as a district
attorney retains strict control over the prosecution. 152 In some jurisdictions, trial
144. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988).
145. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom.
Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
146. State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 178–79 (N.J. 1991) (holding that a court may disqualify a
prosecutor for possessing a personal interest or financial stake in the outcome of a criminal prosecution).
147. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 809–11 (1987) (noting
appointment of an interested prosecutor is so “fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal without
regard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case” (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986))).
148. Id. at 810.
149. Id. at 811–12 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) (footnote omitted).
150. See David Edward Dahlquist, Inherent Conflict: A Case Against the Use of Contingency Fees by Special
Assistants in Quasi-Governmental Prosecutorial Roles, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 745 (2000).
151. See id. at 746.
152. See Bessler, supra note 137, at 521 (noting a split of authority on the matter).
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courts possess discretion to determine whether private attorneys may assist a
district attorney when prosecuting a criminal case. 153 Some scholars contend
that the hiring of private prosecutors should be strictly prohibited in order to
ensure the reliability of criminal convictions. 154 Additionally, part-time private
prosecutors bring an increased risk of outside conflicts arising from their
nongovernmental lawyering. 155
These concerns are heightened when special assistants are compensated
with contingency fees. Indeed, permitting a private lawyer serving as a special
assistant to profit from a contingency fee has been called “as absurd as allowing
the Attorney General himself to receive a payoff for each fraudulent business
he successfully challenges or each criminal conviction obtained.” 156
B. Contingency Fees in Civil Forfeiture Cases
The ethical prohibition on contingency fees in criminal cases prompts the
important question of whether contingency fees are ethical when used to
compensate government prosecutors or special assistants in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Civil forfeiture actions are quasi-criminal proceedings that are
disfavored in the law. 157 While civil in form, civil forfeiture actions are by their
nature criminal and in their presentation closely resemble criminal cases
(without the accompanying safeguards). 158 In state drug forfeiture cases, for
example, civil forfeiture actions are filed by prosecutors in the name of the state,
153. See id. (citing case law in which trial courts have exercised discretion when determining whether
private counsel could assist a district attorney in prosecutions).
154. See id. at 569 (“[T]o ensure the reliability of criminal convictions, the use of private prosecutors
must be strictly prohibited. Such prosecutors have strong incentives to please their private clients, and
consequently, the potential for prosecutorial misconduct is particularly high.”).
155. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714–15 (4th Cir. 1967) (finding a due process violation
where a part-time prosecutor was prosecuting a man for assaulting his wife while simultaneously representing
the wife in a divorce proceeding); see also Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1055 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) (finding that the mere appearance of impropriety must be sufficient to establish
a due process violation).
156. Dahlquist, supra note 150, at 780 (citing Daniel J. Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’
Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2832 (1999) (comments of Professor Brickman).
157. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (stating that “a forfeiture
proceeding is quasi-criminal in character” (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886))). Its object,
like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. See also
Commonwealth v. $259.00 Cash U.S. Currency, 860 A.2d 228, 232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (stating that
forfeiture is not favored under Pennsylvania law), abrogated by Commonwealth v. $34,440.00 U.S. Currency,
174 A.3d 1031, 1046 (Pa. 2017).
158. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 697–98 (“In holding that the Fourth Amendment applied
and barred such attempted seizure, Mr. Justice Bradley, for the Court stated: ‘We are also clearly of opinion
that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of
offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal . . . . The
information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one. As, therefore,
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi
criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the
fourth amendment of the constitution.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–34 (1886))).
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and the action arises after police have seized private property allegedly
connected to a crime. The evidence in the case usually relies upon testimony
from police witnesses based upon information often obtained from confidential
informants. Evidence improperly seized by police is subject to exclusion upon
a motion to suppress, and the taking of property in civil forfeiture falls within
the protection of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 159
These similarities have led some courts and professional guidance
committees to apply contingency fee prohibitions in criminal matters to civil
forfeiture and other related civil actions. In People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court,
the California Supreme Court unanimously disqualified an attorney
representing the City of Corona, California, on a contingent fee basis from
prosecuting a nuisance action, noting that government attorneys pursuing
eminent domain against property owners must be unaffected by personal
interests. 160 The California Supreme Court’s reasoning is particularly
instructive:
Occupying a position analogous to a public prosecutor, [the government
attorney] is “possessed . . . of important governmental powers that are
pledged to the accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial
justice . . . .” The duty of a government attorney in an eminent domain action,
which has been characterized as “a sober inquiry into values, designed to strike
a just balance between the economic interests of the public and those of the
landowner, is of high order.” 161

The court emphasized that a prosecutor has a “duty of neutrality . . . [and
w]hen a government attorney has a personal interest in the litigation, the
neutrality so essential to the system is violated.” 162 The court continued,
“[N]eutrality [is not only] essential to a fair outcome for the litigants . . . it is
essential to the proper function of the judicial process as a whole.” 163 As a
result, the court ruled that the attorney could not represent the city because of
a personal financial interest in the outcome. 164 The public obligations inherent
in pursuing eminent domain are similar to those involved in prosecuting
159. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (holding that when civil forfeitures are at least
partially punitive, they fall within the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139
S. Ct. 682 (2019) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and applicable to the states).
160. People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty., 705 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. 1985).
161. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d
545, 551 (1977)).
162. Id. at 350–51.
163. Id. at 351.
164. Id. at 353; see also Ramsey & Kirby, supra note 118, at n.42; cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935). Citing Clancy, some courts have upheld contingency-fee arrangements where private counsel is
simply assisting the government or is under close control and supervision of the government. See, e.g., City &
Cnty. of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Philip Morris Inc. v.
Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230, 1242–43 (Md. 1998).
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criminal and quasi-criminal cases: they demand that the prosecuting attorney be
neutral. 165
The California Supreme Court’s holding underscores the fundamental
principle that a prosecutor is not a representative of an ordinary party to a
controversy. The prosecutor is a public official representing a sovereign entity
whose obligation is to govern impartially and whose primary interest is to see
that justice is done. 166 Our ethical rules have long recognized this special role.
The Model Code instructed that a lawyer who is a full-time or part-time public
officer should not engage in activities in which personal or professional
interests may reasonably conflict with official duties. 167 The Model Rules
underscore that a prosecutor possesses the “responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate.” 168 This public responsibility requires
that a prosecutor undertake procedural and remedial measures as a matter of
obligation that, if not taken, may subject the prosecutor to professional
discipline. 169
Accordingly, lawyers holding public office must refrain from conduct that
might reasonably lead the public to believe that they are using their public
obligations to further their professional success or personal interests. 170 The
decisions of a prosecutor must be made not solely as an advocate but must meet
the public’s overall interest in ensuring that decisions are fair to all. 171
Prosecutors must act evenhandedly and with impartiality 172 to assure fair
outcomes and to maintain the public’s confidence in the rule of law and in the
justness and impartiality of our justice system. 173 For these reasons, prosecutors
must disqualify themselves from any proceedings in which they have a financial
interest in the subject matter of the controversy. 174
This obligation of neutrality is undermined when there is a personal interest
in the litigation regardless of whether the prosecutor is a full-time government
lawyer or a private lawyer hired as a special assistant to stand in the shoes of the
165. Clancy, 39 P.2d at 353.
166. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88–89 (holding that a U.S. prosecutor overstepped the bounds of propriety
and fairness required of representatives of a sovereignty).
167. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
168. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it
specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of
innocent persons.”).
169. Id. (“Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those
obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.”).
170. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-8 n.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
171. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 7-13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
172. People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Ct. of Riverside Cnty., 705 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal. 1985).
173. Id.
174. See MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); Ramsey & Kirby, supra note 118,
at C-56 n.10 (citing MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 8-8) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)); see also Lushing, supra note
112, at 515.
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government prosecutor. When acting in this special capacity, private attorneys
should be held to the same heightened ethical responsibilities of prosecutors,
governed by an obligation to ensure that justice is pursued and the public
interest is properly served. 175 As the California Supreme Court underscored in
Clancy, “[t]he responsibility follows the job . . . . [A lawyer] performing tasks on
behalf of and in the name of the government to which greater standards of
neutrality apply . . . must adhere to those standards.” 176
When the government hires private lawyers to represent the state in
traditional civil litigation, 177 lawyers are typically compensated on a flat fee or
an hourly basis. By providing fixed compensation, governmental authorities
limit conflict risks associated with contingency-fee compensation because
attorney compensation is not dependent upon the outcome of the litigation. In
contrast, contingency fees introduce a personal profit motive that threatens
public obligations and distorts neutral decision-making.
It is axiomatic that we do not permit judges or criminal prosecutors to be
compensated for their official duties by taking a financial percentage of awards
generated in their cases. Unquestionably, personal financial rewards tied to
outcomes have a corrupting influence upon the exercise of official behavior. 178
One of the most notorious examples in recent times of such corruption
involved Pennsylvania’s “Kids for Cash” scandal in which two trial court judges
personally profited from their own sentencing decisions to incarcerate
juveniles. 179 Once these conflicts were exposed, the judges’ unethical conduct
tainted every decision they had made on the bench and undermined community
respect and confidence in the neutrality and fairness of the justice system.
To avoid both actual conflicts and the appearance of conflicts, contingency
fees for all prosecutors—in criminal and quasi-criminal matters—should be
prohibited as unethical and arguably unconstitutional. 180 The American Bar
Association’s Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function has already
175. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Ramsey & Kirby, supra note 118, at C-55
n.3 (citing Bessler, supra note 137, at 516–21).
176. Clancy, 705 P.2d at 351.
177. See Bessler, supra note 137, at 516–21.
178. See Dahlquist, supra note 150, at 781 n.268 (“‘[W]e do not allow judges or prosecutors to take a
percentage of the award because we know how that will impact on their behavior.’” (quoting Daniel J. Capra
et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2827 (1999))).
179. See Jon Schuppe, Pennsylvania Seeks to Close Books on “Kids for Cash” Scandal, NBC NEWS (Aug. 12,
2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pennsylvania-seeks-close-books-kids-cash-scandal-n408
666 (“One of the biggest corruption scandals to hit America’s juvenile justice system started to unfold in
2007, when parents in a central Pennsylvania county began to complain that their children had been tossed
into for-profit youth centers without a lawyer to represent them. Over the past eight years, the kickback
scheme, known as ‘kids for cash,’ has resulted in prison terms for two Luzerne County judges and two
businessmen – and convictions of thousands of juveniles have been tossed out.”).
180. See Clancy, 705 P.2d at 352 (citing F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES
52 (1964)).
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acknowledged the serious ethical considerations of such practices and has called
for their elimination. 181 Though not binding, these standards establish best
practices for prosecutors in the exercise of their professional responsibilities. 182
In short, a prosecutor’s compensation that is contingent upon a successful
outcome in a particular case directly conflicts with broader interests to represent
the state and the public interest. 183
III. CONTINGENCY FEES IN CIVIL FORFEITURE PROSECUTION IN INDIANA
These important concerns have led many states to avoid using contingency
fees when hiring private lawyers to litigate on behalf of the public. 184 The state
of Indiana, however, is a defiant outlier. It explicitly authorizes contingency-fee
compensation for private attorneys who are hired to prosecute civil forfeiture
actions. 185 While low-income property owners in Indiana have no right to an

181. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 136, at 3-2.2(d). For a history of the Criminal Justice Standards, see
Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23 AM. BAR ASS’N
(2009) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/making
ofstandards_marcus.pdf.
182. The Standards are written and intended to be entirely consistent with the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and are not intended to modify a prosecutor’s obligations under applicable rules, statutes,
or the Constitution. They are aspirational or described as “best practices” and are not intended to serve as
the basis for the imposition of professional discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused
or convicted persons, to create a standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to
suppress evidence or dismiss a charge. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 136, at 3-1.1(b).
183. See Dahlquist, supra note 150, at 781, n.269 (citing EPA. v. Pollution Control Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50
(Ill. 1977)). It is of note that, when applied to the defense of a civil forfeiture action, a Pennsylvania bar ethics
committee concluded that the ethical prohibition on contingent fees in criminal cases would likely apply to
the defense of a drug forfeiture petition. See Pa. Bar. Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp., Op. 89-174
(1989) (opining that Pennsylvania’s Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(d)(2) would in all likelihood apply to
drug forfeiture petitions because forfeiture petitions, though “civil in form,” are “criminal in character” (citing
Commonwealth v. Landy 362 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976))). The special nature of civil forfeiture
that makes it quasi-criminal distinguishes it from traditional civil cases that may arise out of criminal activity.
For example, a lawyer may represent a client on a contingency-fee basis in a tax appeal where criminal charges
are threatened but not yet brought, see ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 93-373 (1993)
(permitting a reverse contingency-fee arrangement), or in a civil qui tam action where a recovery will provide
funds for defending a related fraud prosecution, see Pa. Bar Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Pro. Resp.,
Informal Op. 2004-17.
184. See Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public Nuisance
Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 971–72 (2007) (raising instances of potential conflicts of interest when
governments hire private lawyers on a contingency-fee basis); see also Ramsey & Kirby, supra note 118, at C-55
(addressing the impropriety of utilizing contingency-fee contracts to compensate special assistants in civil
forfeiture cases). In civil forfeiture cases, the risk of success for the government is low, the property owner
is often unrepresented, and the procedural safeguards associated with criminal cases are not present in these
quasi-criminal cases. This Article takes no position on compensation methods for special assistants who are
hired to litigate large, high-risk, traditional personal injury litigation against well-resourced entities, especially
in matters in which the private bar traditionally has special expertise that prosecutors may lack.
185. IND. CODE § 34-24-1-8 (2018) (permitting civil forfeiture cases to be prosecuted by private
lawyers on a contingency-fee basis); see also Nick Sibilla, Indiana Senate Passes Constitutionally Dubious Scheme to
Let Police Profit from Civil Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://ij.org/press-release/indiana-senatepasses-constitutionally-dubious-scheme-let-police-profit-civil-forfeiture (“In Indiana, not only can the
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attorney and frequently default in civil forfeiture proceedings without counsel,
government-funded prosecutors are authorized to expand their ranks by hiring
private attorneys who are then rewarded with a healthy percentage of all the
property they can forfeit.
This practice conflicts sharply with the U.S. Justice Department’s policy
prohibiting government lawyers from having a personal stake in forfeiture
proceedings. The Justice Department’s Code of Ethical Conduct provides that a
prosecutor’s employment or salary shall not depend upon the level of seizures
or forfeitures obtained. 186 Some commentators have long criticized Indiana’s
practice of permitting contingency fees for private prosecutors in civil forfeiture
actions. 187 One scholar analogized Indiana’s practice to bounty hunters: “The
biggest scandal of all is Indiana’s institutionalized bounty hunter system in
which state DA’s contract with private attorneys to handle all of the county’s
civil forfeiture cases for a contingent fee of a quarter or a third of all the
property they forfeit.” 188
The reason for such strong language is clear. In civil forfeiture actions,
prosecutors are duty bound to return property and not pursue forfeiture of
seized property when forfeiture is not legally warranted or if justice so demands.
A prosecutor who learns that there is no nexus between the seized property and
an alleged crime (or that there is no crime at all), or that a property owner is an
innocent owner under the law, is duty-bound to withdraw the action and return
the seized property. But in delegating this obligation to a private attorney whose
compensation is tied only to what can be successfully forfeited, the private
prosecutor is unlikely to abandon their only path to a fee.
The danger of permitting contingency fees in civil forfeiture cases is hardly
speculative. Indiana experienced this danger directly in the notorious Mark
McKinney case. McKinney was a salaried deputy prosecutor for approximately
ten years, during which he prosecuted many drug offenses. 189 At the very same
time, he was a part-time private lawyer prosecuting civil forfeiture cases in
which he obtained hefty contingency fees from the property he was able to
government use civil forfeiture to confiscate private property without filing criminal charges, law enforcement
agencies have routinely funneled millions in forfeiture funds to pad their budgets.”).
186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL (2019); see also NAT’L DIST. ATT’Y’S
ASS’N, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 4
(1992) (“Salaries and personal benefits of any person influencing or controlling the selection, investigation,
or prosecution of forfeiture cases must be managed in such a way that employment or salary does not depend
upon the level of seizures or forfeitures in which they participate.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11469
(West 2020) (“Potential revenue must not be allowed to jeopardize the effective investigation and prosecution
of criminal offenses, officer safety, the integrity of ongoing investigations, or the due process rights of
citizens.”).
187. See DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES 66 (2017) (ebook);
see also Heather Gillers et al., Cashing in on Crime, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 14, 2010, at A1.
188. SMITH, supra note 187 (emphasis omitted).
189. In re McKinney, 948 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2011).
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forfeit. This dual (and conflicting) role was carried out in open view under
Indiana state law, which permits contingency fees in civil forfeiture cases. 190
Moreover, McKinney engaged in these actions with the full knowledge and
approval of the county’s lead prosecutor, who personally approved McKinney
to receive a 25% contingency fee from the forfeitures he obtained.
McKinney’s engagement in self-dealing lasted over ten years. McKinney
and a co-prosecutor opened a private bank account as signatories to what was
called the “Asset Forfeiture Attorney Fee Account.” 191 The 25% contingency
fees they derived from forfeited funds were deposited into this account and
then disbursed to them. McKinney routinely used confidential settlement
agreements to transfer seized property and cash from criminal defendants to a
local governmental subdivision by agreement of the parties and without court
supervision. He then invoiced and collected from the subdivision his 25%
contingency fee even though these were private settlements and did not
constitute court judgments. 192
At times, the criminal drug cases and civil forfeiture actions that McKinney
prosecuted were open contemporaneously. 193 These practices persisted despite
concerns voiced to the lead prosecutor by the State Board of Accounts’
auditor. 194 Incredibly, the state attorney general issued an advisory opinion
permitting such payments and finding no conflict of interest. 195 As McKinney’s
practices persisted, more public officials called for an investigation into his
actions. The local mayor even filed a request with the Commission on Judicial
Qualifications requesting a special prosecutor to investigate the matter, and a
local circuit-court judge brought an action leading to the issuance of a local rule
that required reimbursement of fees received in forfeiture cases.
Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court’s disciplinary commission brought
charges against McKinney alleging that he violated conflict-of-interest rules and
engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 196 A hearing
190. IND. CODE § 34-24-1-8 (subsequently amended).
191. McKinney, 948 N.E.2d at 1157.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1158.
195. The court stated:
The auditor of the State Board of Accounts (“Board”) raised the issue with [lead p]rosecutor Reed
in 1998. The Board sought a[n] advisory opinion from the Indiana Attorney General on the issues
of whether various attorneys within a prosecutor’s office could be paid in excess of their state
minimum salary from funds generated by the prosecution of forfeiture and other cases; and if so,
whether Indiana Code § 36-2-5-14 prohibited such compensation in excess of $5,000. The
Attorney General’s advisory opinion, dated November 18, 1998, said that such payments could
be made and that the statutory cap applied only to full- time prosecuting attorneys but not to
others, including DPAs [deputy prosecuting attorneys]. The opinion did not address any conflict
of interest issues.
Id.
196. Id. at 1158. The Commission brought charges against McKinney alleging violations of several
Indiana professional conduct rules, including Rule 1.7(b) (representing a client—here the State—when his
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officer concluded that McKinney acted to protect his private interest over his
public duties by personally profiting from forfeiture property in open criminal
cases in which he was involved. The hearing officer found that McKinney
steadfastly chose his private financial interests over the public’s interest even
when confronted with serious objections expressed by leading public
officials. 197 On appeal and based upon stipulated facts, the Indiana Supreme
Court determined that McKinney’s misconduct was serious and warranted a
suspension from the practice of law. 198
The McKinney case was both disturbing and revealing. It exposed the
unethical, self-dealing actions of one prosecutor but, more importantly, it
revealed a prosecutorial culture that subjugated public obligations to the pursuit
of profit. McKinney’s actions were not the singular actions of one prosecutor
gone astray. The lead prosecutor set up and approved the procedure that
permitted McKinney to retain 25% of civil forfeiture judgments at the same
time that he was prosecuting criminal drug cases. 199 Neither McKinney nor his
fellow prosecutors abandoned this practice even when openly challenged by
public officials. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated, “At no time did
[McKinney take] . . . a critical look at the system . . . . [He] essentially turned a
blind eye to these now-conceded ethical violations for well over a decade.” 200
McKinney’s proffered defense to disciplinary charges was itself revealing.
McKinney argued that the asset-forfeiture program was created by the lead
prosecutor before he joined the office, and he was simply relying on office
policy with his supervisors’ full knowledge and approval. McKinney cited the
approval obtained from a state board of accounts, a circuit judge, and the state
prosecutors’ council—which all found nothing unethical in this conduct—as
well as a special prosecutor’s review that cleared him of criminal wrongdoing. 201

representation may have been materially limited by his own self-interest), 1.7(a)(2) (representing a client where
there is a concurrent conflict of interest), 1.8(1) (representing a client as a private attorney in a matter where
he has official prosecutorial authority or responsibilities), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). Id.
197. Id. at 1159.
198. Id. at 1161 (holding that McKinney “violated the Indiana Professional Conduct Rules by
representing the State when the representation could have been materially limited by his own self-interest in
receiving compensation as a private attorney from property forfeited in civil forfeiture actions and under
[Confidential Settlement Agreements]”).
199. Although the stipulated facts state that lead prosecutor Reed set up the contingency-fee procedure
for judgments from which McKinney benefited, Reed claimed that he did not know about the existence of
confidential settlement accounts until after he left office. See id. at 1157 n.2.
200. Id. at 1159.
201. See Jennifer Nelson, Prosecutor Files Answer to Disciplinary Charges, IND. LAW. (Jan. 1, 2010),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/22060-prosecutor-files-answer-to-disciplinary-charges.
The verified complaint filed by the Indiana Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Commission in May
2009 claims McKinney violated four of Indiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct – 1.7(b),
1.7(a)(2), 1.8(l), and 8.4(d). The allegations state that his profiting in drug forfeiture cases – he was
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McKinney’s defense was a serious indictment of an entire system that amply
illustrated the danger of permitting prosecutors to pursue civil forfeiture cases
on contingency fees.
The Indiana Supreme Court suspended McKinney from the practice of law
for 120 days, and a circuit judge later ordered him to repay $168,092 in
attorneys’ fees he obtained in drug-related civil forfeiture cases. 202 In so doing,
the Indiana Supreme Court stated that the people of Indiana were entitled to
McKinney’s “undivided loyalty.” 203 McKinney’s pursuit of personal gain
compromised the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion and diminished public
confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the justice system. 204 The McKinney
case amply demonstrates why contingency-fee lawyering in civil forfeiture is not
compatible with prosecutorial duties.
The McKinney case does not stand alone. In Georgia, state law permitted
a district attorney to appoint special assistants in certain legal matters. 205
Pursuant to this authority, a lead prosecutor appointed two private Georgia
lawyers as special assistants to pursue RICO claims 206 against eight convenience
stores engaged in illegal gaming practices. 207 The contract with the lawyers
provided that they would receive fees of at least one-third of the gross amount
recovered by them on behalf of the state by either settlement or suit, and in the
event of an appeal, 40% of the gross amount of any recovery. 208 The police
seized gaming machines from these convenience stores, and Georgia authorities
paid 25 percent of the money forfeited by or seized from drug defendants per fee agreements –
impeded the state’s criminal cases that he was involved in prosecuting.
Before becoming prosecutor in January 2007, McKinney was a deputy prosecutor beginning in
1995 and worked with the now-disassembled Muncie-Delaware Drug Task Force. He was
personally involved in drug investigations of many of the resulting criminal cases. From 2000 to
2007, he also profited through compensation based on the value of contracts with defendants
and attorney fees for his private practice work of suing for the forfeitures of criminal defendants’
property, according to the complaint . . . . The State Board of Accounts, Delaware Circuit Judge
Richard Dailey, and the Indiana Prosecuting Attorney’s Council also found nothing to suggest
there was an ethical problem, according to McKinney’s response.
Id.
202. Professor Joel Schumm of the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law expressed
concern that McKinney’s suspension was not a warning to other prosecutors because, while his case was
extreme, his punishment was fairly light. See Matt Clarke, Indiana Prosecutor Disciplined for Conflict of Interest,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS, (Apr. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/apr/15/indianaprosecutor-disciplined-for-conflict-of-interest.
203. McKinney, 948 N.E.2d at 1160 (quoting In re Ryan, 824 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. 2005)).
204. Id. at 1161 (“Respondent’s misconduct created an environment in which, at the very least, the
public trust in his ability to faithfully and independently represent the interests of the State was
compromised.”); see also Indiana Prosecutors Under Fire for Handling of Forfeiture Funds, CRIME REP. (June 17,
2011), https://thecrimereport.org/2011/06/17/2011-06-pros-forfe (“Delaware County Prosecutor Mark
McKinney was suspended from practicing law for 120 days for professional misconduct in his work on
forfeiture cases as a deputy prosecutor from 1995 to 2006.”).
205. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-18-20 (West 2019).
206. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to -14-12 (West 2015).
207. Greater Ga. Amusements, LLC v. State, 728 S.E.2d 744, 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
208. Id.
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filed for forfeiture against the in rem defendants, including the gaming
machines. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, the property owners
challenged the legality of the contingency-fee contract on the basis that it
violated Georgia public policy. 209
Although this presented a question of first impression in Georgia, the court
of appeals found that the Supreme Court of Georgia had previously
disapproved of contingency-fee arrangements for public employees who were
responsible for acting in the public interest. 210 In that prior case, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that contingency compensation paid to private entities
for assisting local tax assessors by locating and appraising unreturned properties
was void against public policy. 211 There, the court concluded that “[f]airness
and impartiality are threatened where a private organization has a financial stake
in the amount of tax collected as a result of the assessment it recommends.” 212
Following this precedent, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reasoned that
similar public policy concerns applied to district attorneys who are entrusted
with an obligation to seek justice. The Court of Appeals quoted a Supreme
Court of Georgia decision that opined on this obligation, stating:
In our criminal justice system, the district attorney represents the people of
the state in prosecuting individuals who have been charged with violating our
state’s criminal laws. The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special
duty exists because the prosecutor represents the sovereign and should
exercise restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers.
Therefore, the district attorney is more than an advocate for one party and has
additional professional responsibilities as a public prosecutor to make decisions in the public’s
interest. 213

As a result, the Court of Appeals struck down the district attorney’s
contingency-fee arrangement, reasoning that it “guarantee[d] at least the
appearance of a conflict of interest between his public duty to seek justice and

209. Id. In this case, the appellant also challenged the district attorney’s authority to hire special
assistants in this matter, but that claim was rejected by the Court of Appeals of Georgia; the two lawyers were
hired only for the specific purpose of this case and as such, the limited nature of their employment comported
with state law. Id. at 746.
210. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons, 401 S.E.2d 4, 5 (Ga. 1991) (holding that contingency
compensation for private entities hired to assist board of tax assessors by locating and appraising unreturned
properties was void against public policy)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 747 (quoting State v. Wooten, 543 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 2001)); Frazier v. State, 362 S.E.2d
351, 357 (Ga. 1987). Notably, the Frazier case cited ABA Canon 7 for the principle that a government lawyer
“does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private
practice” and therefore is required “to seek just results rather than the result desired by a client.” 362 S.E.2d
at 357.
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his private right to obtain compensation for his services.” 214 “Such an
arrangement is all the more repugnant,” the Court stated, “in the context of
Georgia RICO forfeiture actions, which can be brought only by the State and
are ‘disfavored’ under Georgia law.” 215 By making attorneys’ fees contingent
upon the outcome of the forfeiture case, the Court held that the private
attorney’s financial interest in being compensated for his services conflicted
with the prosecutor’s sworn public duty to seek justice. 216 Soon after this case,
the Georgia legislature banned the practice of compensating special assistants
with contingency fees derived from forfeiture proceeds. 217
The payment of a contingency fee to a special assistant for official duties
has been characterized as a betrayal of impartiality and of a system designed to
protect the public, 218 rendering the assistant “incapable of performing his duty
as an impartial state officer.” 219 The public has a right to question how a special
assistant can act neutrally and impartially in a civil forfeiture case when
compensation depends entirely on the amount of property that can be
successfully forfeited. Even if a special assistant acts with absolute integrity, this
conflict creates an appearance of impropriety that is unavoidable. Some may
contend that close oversight by a lead prosecutor will adequately protect the
public’s interest. However, as the McKinney case amply demonstrates, there is
little reason for confidence in assurances of official oversight, and in any event,
oversight does nothing to eliminate the appearance of impropriety.
Rather than eliminate contingency fees in forfeiture actions, as Georgia did,
Indiana responded meekly to the abuses exposed in the McKinney case. The
214. Greater Ga. Amusements, LLC, 728 S.E.2d at 747.
215. Id. (citing Patel v. State, 713 S.E.2d 381, 384 (Ga. 2011)); Pabey v. State, 585 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2003). In a footnote, the court of appeals also noted that recently enacted legislation applicable to
contracts entered into on or after July 1, 2011 prohibited contingency-fee compensation in forfeiture actions
under this title. See Greater Ga. Amusements, LLC, 728 S.E.2d at 747 n.2 (referencing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-12
(2011)); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co., 401 S.E.2d at 5 (holding that independent contractors hired by a board
of tax assessors may not be paid a percentage of the taxes collected because “[f]airness and impartiality are
threatened where a private organization has a financial stake in the amount of tax collected as a result of the
assessment it recommends”).
216. Greater Ga. Amusements, LLC, 728 S.E.2d at 747.
217. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-12 (2011) (“Restrictions on contingency fee compensation of attorney
appointed to represent state in forfeiture action[:] (a) In any forfeiture action brought pursuant to this title,
an attorney appointed by the Attorney General or district attorney as a special assistant attorney general,
special assistant district attorney, or other attorney appointed to represent this state in such forfeiture action
shall not be compensated on a contingent basis by a percentage of assets which arise or are realized from
such forfeiture action. Such attorneys shall also not be compensated on a contingent basis by an hourly, fixed
fee, or other arrangement which is contingent on a successful prosecution of such forfeiture action.”); see also
H.B. 103, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019). At the time of this publication, the bill sits in the
judiciary committee. Greg Land, Legislative Package Takes Another Stab at Rewriting State’s Civil Forfeiture Laws,
DAILY REP. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2019/02/19/legislative-packagetakes-another-stab-at-rewriting-states-civil-forfeiture-laws (detailing a Georgia lawmaker’s efforts to chip
away at state forfeiture laws).
218. See Dahlquist, supra note 150, at 781 (citing Daniel J. Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’
Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2832 (1999) (comments of Professor Brickman)).
219. Id. at 781.
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Indiana legislature merely prohibited any attorney paid with contingency fees
from serving as a deputy prosecuting attorney, 220 and it required future
contingency fees to be in writing and approved by the state attorney general. 221
As a result, Indiana prosecutors continue to hire private lawyers to prosecute
civil forfeiture actions in the name of the state while, at the same time, those
private attorneys draw handsome contingency fees from their court winnings.
The pursuit of profit remains the name of the game. It is no wonder that a
Pennsylvania appellate court once cautioned that civil forfeiture, without proper
protections, amounts to little more than “state-sanctioned theft.” 222
With Indiana’s continued approval of contingency fees to pay private
lawyers hired to prosecute civil forfeiture cases, this Article now examines court
data from civil forfeiture cases prosecuted by a well-known Indiana private
attorney paid with contingency fees and compares that data to cases handled by
government prosecutors.
A. Private Lawyer Contingency Fees and Court Data Findings
Using Indiana’s statewide Odyssey case management system, 223 we first
reviewed all civil forfeiture cases filed in calendar year 2018 in Marion County,
Indiana. This revealed a total of seventy-two cases. We selected Marion County
because it is the state’s most populous county and because the prosecutor’s
office in that county litigated their own civil forfeiture cases during 2018.
Therefore, there were no contingency fees involved. By selecting Marion
County, we hoped to make general observations about civil forfeiture litigation
conducted by full-time government prosecutors as well as to establish a “norm”
against which we might compare civil forfeiture cases handled by private
attorneys on a contingency-fee basis for other Indiana counties. We selected
calendar year 2018 because we wanted to review a full year of civil forfeiture
cases in which most of the filed cases had already concluded so that our study
could also look at case outcomes.

220. IND. CODE § 34-24-1-8(c)–(d) (2018). In addition, the amended statute required that the
compensation agreement be in writing and approved by the attorney general.
221. IND. CODE § 34-24-1-8(b).
222. See Commonwealth v. Younge, 667 A.2d 739, 747 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Given the quasi-criminal
nature of the forfeiture proceeding, Pennsylvania courts have stated that notice and opportunity to be heard
as provided for in the Forfeiture Act guard against those proceedings from “amount[ing] to little more
than state-sanctioned theft.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Mosley, 702 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth
v. $1155.00 Cash, 909 A.2d 12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006); Commonwealth v. All That Certain Lot or Parcel of
Land Located at 605 Univ. Drive, 61 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Commonwealth
v. All That Certain Lot or Parcel of Land Located at 605 Univ. Drive, 104 A.3d 411 (Pa. 2014).
223. Case Search, MYCASE.IN.GOV, https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search (last visited
Feb. 10, 2021).
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For comparative purposes, we selected all Indiana civil forfeiture cases filed
in the same calendar year in which private attorney J. Gregory Garrison
appeared as counsel of record. Our study revealed a total of eighty-seven cases
filed in 2018 by Garrison in multiple Indiana counties other than Marion
County. 224 We selected attorney Garrison’s cases because he has handled civil
forfeiture cases in Indiana on a contingency-fee basis for many years. We first
learned of Garrison’s involvement from a 2010 Indianapolis Star article that
reported Garrison was a “high-profile member of the legal community” who
had taken in around $777,000 from his Indiana forfeiture work during 2009. 225
The two data sets we obtained enabled us to compare a full year of
forfeiture cases and to discern the prevalence of public, private, or pro se
defense counsel; the property types and cash amounts seized; the outcomes of
the cases; the extent to which property was returned to defendants; and the
distribution of forfeited property to law enforcement and other public funds.
Since we have data sets from only one calendar year, we want to be careful not
to overstate our observations and conclusions. Certainly, more empirical
research is needed. Still, this limited data analysis suggests troubling concerns
about civil forfeiture generally and, most significantly, about those forfeiture
cases handled by private counsel on a contingency-fee basis.
To assist us in this review, we obtained a copy of the contract between
Garrison Law Firm, LLP and the Morgan County Prosecutor’s Office 226 that
gave us additional information on private counsel’s scope of work and
responsibilities in asset forfeiture cases. 227 In all forfeiture actions, Garrison
agreed to provide the full range of legal services—including drafting and filing
224. According to court data in the Odyssey case management system, Garrison did not handle any
civil forfeiture cases filed in Marion County in 2018. Id. The Indianapolis Star previously reported that Garrison
had estimated that he received $125,000 from his forfeiture and racketeering work in Marion County in 2009.
Gillers et al., supra note 187. At some later time, Garrison ceased handling forfeiture cases for Marion County
while continuing to do so for other Indiana counties. In 2018, all of Marion County’s forfeiture cases,
according to the statewide database, were handled by government prosecutors from the county prosecutor’s
office. Case Search, supra note 223. In response to formal requests for records, we obtained contracts between
Morgan, Rush, Wabash, Hancock, Fayette, and Shelby counties and the Garrison Law Firm. These contracts
are essentially identical, and they include a provision requiring that the private prosecutor hold “no conflict
of interest (as that term is defined in the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct) that will preclude Counsel from
providing the Legal Services.” E.g., Contract between Garrison Law Firm, LLC and the Morgan Cnty.
Prosecuting Attorney 2 (June 26, 2007) (on file with author). The contracts also direct Garrison and his
associates to immediately inform the prosecutor’s office if a conflict of interest exists in handling a forfeiture
action. Id. As such, these contracts recognize the potential emergence of conflicts of interest by outside
part-time attorneys on a case-by-case basis but do not address the systemic concern that contingency fees in
the prosecution of civil-forfeiture cases are unethical per se.
225. See Gillers et al., supra note 187.
226. Morgan County is one of thirteen Indiana counties in which attorney Garrison litigated civil
forfeiture cases filed in calendar year 2018. Case Search, supra note 223.
227. The contract between the Morgan County Prosecutor’s Office and Garrison Law Firm, LLP was
obtained through a request for records, filed pursuant to the Indiana Access to Public Records Act § 5-14-3.
We sent this request to the Morgan County Records Department and then forwarded it to the Morgan County
Prosecutor’s Office. The contract is on file with the author. Thereafter, we received contracts from Rush,
Wabash, Hancock, Fayette, Shelby, and Grant counties, and these contracts are also on file with the author.
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post-seizure probable cause affidavits, complaints, subsequent pleadings, and
settlements, as well as managing depositions, pretrial conferences, hearings, and
trials. According to the contract, the prosecutor’s office reviews forfeiture
recommendations and other case records from law-enforcement agents and
then forwards those recommendations directly to Garrison for handling. 228
The contract gives Garrison discretion to settle cases, share seized assets
with property owners, or proceed to trial without consulting the prosecutor’s
office. As compensation for his contractual legal services, Garrison is entitled
to thirty percent of the first $10,000 of proceeds or money obtained through
settlement or judgment; twenty percent of proceeds or money obtained through
a settlement or judgment that falls between $10,000 and $100,000; and fifteen
percent of proceeds or money obtained through a settlement or judgment that
is over $100,000. 229 The contract does not provide for a fixed fee or an hourly
rate of compensation. Instead, Garrison’s compensation is calculated based
entirely upon an agreed-upon percentage of the forfeiture proceeds that
Garrison is able to obtain. 230
To begin this analysis, we extracted 2018 civil forfeiture data from the
Indiana Odyssey case management system for Marion County and for cases
handled by Garrison. We noted that the number of civil forfeiture cases handled
by Marion County’s government prosecutors was roughly equivalent to the
number of cases that Garrison handled in other Indiana counties. 231 However,
while the number of seizures was comparable, the amount of cash seized by law
enforcement was vastly different.
Cash Seized by Law Enforcement in 2018

Marion County
Garrison’s Cases

Total
Amount of
Cash
Seized
$738,295.26
$292,277.24

Average
Amount of
Cash
Seized
$10,254.10
$3,699.71

Median
Amount
of Cash
Seized
$2,667.00
$927.00

Percentage
of Seizures
$1,000 or
Less
28.17%
53.01%

228. The contract reserves the right of the prosecutor’s office to not refer individual cases, and it also
reserves the right of Garrison and his associates to decline representation in individual cases. Contract
between Garrison Law Firm, LLC and the Morgan Cnty. Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 224, at 3.
229. The contract also entitles Garrison to thirty percent of all proceeds or money obtained through
the prosecution of corrupt business-influence violations. Under the contract, contingency fees cover all
expenses incurred during the fulfillment of legal services. Contract Between Garrison Law Firm, LLC and
the Morgan Cty. Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 224, at 3.
230. See id.
231. There were seventy-two Marion County forfeiture cases and eighty-seven Garrison forfeiture
cases across multiple Indiana counties. Some of the cases involved multiple seizures and multiple defendants.
Case Search, supra note 223.
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There may be many explanations for the large difference in total amount of
cash seized. Marion County is the most populous county in Indiana and home
to the state’s capital city, Indianapolis, while Garrison’s cases involved seizures
across thirteen smaller counties. Motorists in Indiana’s largest county with
robust economic activity may, for legitimate reasons, be travelling with more
cash in their possession. What is significant, however, is that the median value
of seizures in Garrison’s cases was less than $1,000. As the median value of
seized cash decreases, and especially when it falls below $1,000, it can have a
profound impact upon the economic feasibility to hire a lawyer to defend
against the loss of property. Put simply, it will cost more to hire an attorney to
defend against civil forfeiture than the amount of seized cash. As a result,
motorists in this situation often lack counsel and face a substantial disadvantage
in trying to protect their property in a complex legal system. Understandably,
property owners give up even though they are not charged with a crime, did
nothing wrong, and have unasserted statutory and constitutional defenses to
forfeiture available to them. 232
This may also help to explain, in part, a huge disparity in the default rate
between civil forfeiture cases in Marion County and those cases handled by
Garrison, along with a disparity in the percentage of cases in which a defendant
appears pro se in the forfeiture action.
Default Rate and Percentage of Cases with Pro Se Defendants
Default Rate
Marion County

21.25%

Percentage of Cases
with Pro Se
Defendants
44.44%

Garrison’s Cases

64.84%

85.06%

One of the most troubling aspects of civil forfeiture has long been its high
default rates. In such cases, the taking of private property is not tested in the
courts. Property owners simply walk away from their property. In some cases,
they may feel that it is not in their best interests to contest because they may
not want to invite criminal charges when none have been brought, or there may
be criminal charges pending and they do not want to claim ownership over cash
that might be ill-gotten. However, too frequently, the reason is not strategic at
232. For these reasons, some jurisdictions impose a minimum cash threshold under which forfeiture
is not permitted or require a criminal conviction if the amount sought to forfeit is below $1,000. See, e.g., Civil
Asset Forfeiture Amendment Act of 2014, § 108(d)(1)(C), 62 D.C. Reg. 1920, 1930 (Feb. 13, 2015) (“There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that currency totaling $1000 or less was not used or intended to be used in
furtherance of a forfeitable offense, are not the proceeds of a forfeitable offense, and therefore are not subject
to forfeiture . . . .”); S. 4970, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (requiring police departments to make quarterly
reports on forfeiture activities).
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all. It is pragmatic. It costs too much to hire a lawyer in relation to the value of
the seized property, and lacking counsel, property owners are intimidated and
overwhelmed by a complex legal system in which the full resources of the state
are against them. For those unable to afford a lawyer, there is no right to counsel
and many are unable to miss work or lose wages in order to attend multiple
court hearings. Without legal help, property owners are unaware of statutory
and constitutional defenses available to protect their property.
High default rates may also signal serious deficiencies with notice to
property owners, service of legal process, or a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. The default rate in Garrison’s cases is three times the default rate of
government prosecutors’ cases in Marion County. This is a troubling disparity
that cannot be fully explained by a lower percentage of defense lawyers
appearing in his cases. This high default rate warrants a closer look at systemic
issues in Garrison’s cases, especially as they relate to service of process and
initial communications with property owners, to understand the reasons for this
disparity. A system that permits police and prosecutors to seize and forfeit
property from innocent citizens, without any court scrutiny, is ripe for abuse.
Civil Forfeiture Outcomes

Marion
County
Garrison’s
Cases

Default
Rate

Withdrawal
Rate

Settlement
Rate

Trial
Rate

58.75%

Dispositive
Motion
Rate
0%

21.25%

17.50%

64.84%

17.58%

10.99%

1.09%

5.50%

0%

There are also troubling disparities when we compare outcome data
between Marion County’s civil forfeiture cases and Garrison’s civil forfeiture
cases handled on behalf of other counties. This outcome data shows that
withdrawal and dispositive motion rates are comparable, but there is a large
disparity in settlement rates and default rates. Government prosecutors in
Marion County settle well more than half of their forfeiture cases with property
owners, while Garrison settles only one out of every ten cases. If defaults are
excluded in calculating settlement rates, the settlement disparity rate is still
substantial: Government prosecutors settle 74.60% of their nondefaulting cases
while Garrison settles only 31.25% of nondefaulting cases. This tells us that
Garrison is more likely to refuse to settle and instead proceed to trial where the
amount of forfeiture payoff is greatest (and the amount of attorney’s fees are
greatest). On the other hand, government prosecutors are more likely to settle
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their cases by negotiating a 50-50 split of seized cash. 233 While a higher
settlement rate suggests a willingness to be fair and pursue justice, rather than
profit, it also presents a troubling dynamic. If police properly seized cash under
circumstances warranting forfeiture, why are government prosecutors so quick
to split the cash with owners? Does this suggest that in many cases there is
simply no legal basis for the forfeiture of seized private property? If so, are
prosecutors not duty-bound to return all of the seized cash, rather than just
half? In both subsets of data, there are troubling ethical issues warranting
further study.
While the Indiana civil forfeiture cases reviewed mostly involved seizures
of cash, police also seized vehicles in 2018. 234 The number of seized vehicles is
relatively small, but it is still informative to compare the return rate of seized
vehicles between Marion County and Garrison’s cases.
Return Rates of Seized Vehicles

Marion County
Garrison’s Cases

Vehicles
Seized
17
9

Vehicles
Returned
17
2

Return Rate
100%
22.22%

Once again, we see a significant disparity, this time in the return of seized
vehicles. Marion County prosecutors always returned seized vehicles to their
owners (so long as owners paid an assessed fee of $450 for towing and storage
costs in most cases), while Garrison failed to return seized vehicles in roughly
80% of his cases. Once again, Garrison was much less likely than government
prosecutors to negotiate with property owners.
In examining 2018 outcome data, it is particularly helpful to look at the
ultimate disposition of seized cash. We looked at how much cash is returned to
owners and how much is permanently forfeited. We wanted to examine
outcome differences, if any, between cases prosecuted by government attorneys
and those prosecuted by private counsel with contingency fees, and what that
might suggest about civil forfeiture. This review began with a comparison of
forfeiture rates and cash return rates:

233. Almost all settlements in Marion County involved an equal split of seized property between the
prosecutor and the property owner.
234. Court data also revealed that police occasionally seized other items of property, such as jewelry
and firearms. This study did not attempt to value those items or include them in this review.

(DO NOT DELETE)

3/23/2021 12:43 AM

574

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3:531

Forfeiture and Return Rates of Seized Cash

Marion
County
Garrison’s
Cases

Amount of
Cash Seized

Amount of
Cash
Forfeited

Amount of
Cash
Returned

$253,937.37

Forfeiture
Rate of
Cash
Seized
34.40%

$481,715.76

Return
Rate of
Cash
Seized
65.60%

$738,295.26
$292,277.24

$245,840.24

84.11%

$46,437.00

15.89%

The outcome data revealed large disparities in both forfeiture and cash
return rates. While government prosecutors in Marion County returned almost
two-thirds of all cash seized by police, private counsel returned less than 16%.
Garrison forfeited in absolute dollars almost the same amount of cash as
government prosecutors did in Marion County, but this meant that Garrison’s
forfeiture rate was well more than double the forfeiture rate of government
prosecutors. Is this disparity attributable to differences in the legality of seizures
in Marion County compared to the legality of those in counties represented by
Garrison? Or is this disparity due to something else, such as a different
understanding and commitment to public obligations required of prosecutors?
One thing is absolutely clear from outcome data in civil forfeiture cases
prosecuted by both Marion County prosecutors and Garrison on behalf of
multiple counties: out of a combined total of 159 civil forfeiture cases filed in
2018, not one case resulted in a court judgment in favor of the property
owner. 235 Property owners infrequently went to trial to challenge the taking of
their property, regardless of the facts. This fact may reflect the reality that
forfeiture laws are stacked against property owners and that it is simply too
expensive to litigate a civil forfeiture case with counsel when the amount of
money at stake is relatively low. For the poor, there is no right to counsel, and
therefore, there is little chance of obtaining free legal help. It is hard to have
confidence in the fairness of a civil justice system in which property owners
cannot point to even one case during an entire year in which they prevailed in
court and obtained a judgment against the forfeiture of their property.
We also examined the disbursement of forfeited proceeds to gain insights
into who benefits most from civil forfeitures and whether there are differences
between cases litigated by government prosecutors and private counsel. Indiana
law provides for how forfeited monies are to be disbursed, with attorney’s fees
235. Of cases decided after a hearing or upon dispositive motion, all court judgments were entered in
favor of the plaintiff (government). In cases that were settled by agreement, judgment was entered for the
plaintiff regarding any property retained by the government, but no judgment was entered for the defendant
regarding any property returned to the property owner.

(DO NOT DELETE)

3/23/2021 12:43 AM

2021]Prosecuting Civil Asset Forfeiture on Contingency Fees: Looking for Profit in All the Wrong Places 575

for private counsel given first priority and the Indiana Common School Fund
last in line. 236 This data reveals that the hiring of private attorney Garrison to
handle forfeiture cases pumped substantially more forfeited funds into the
pockets and budgets of both public and private prosecutors. The following
table illustrates this disbursement:
Forfeiture Disbursements to Public and Private Prosecutors
Attorney’s
Fees to
Private
Counsel
(Garrison)
Marion
$0.00
County
Garrison Cases $71,513.91

Forfeited
Cash to
Local
Prosecutor’s
Office

Percentage
of Forfeited
Cash
Directed to
Prosecutors

$51,909.96

Total
Forfeited
Cash to
Prosecutors
Forfeiture
Fund
$51,909.96

$108,698.37

$180,212.28

73.30%

20.44%

If any monies remain after distribution of forfeited funds to outside counsel
and the local prosecutor’s forfeiture fund, there are three potential recipients
under Indiana law: the general funds of the state for reimbursement costs, the
general fund of the local police department responsible for the seizure, or the
county fund supporting the county drug task force, as selected by the local
court. 237 Only after all attorney’s fees and reimbursement costs to offset
236. [T]he proceeds of the sale or the money be distributed as follows:
(A) To pay attorney’s fees, if outside counsel is employed under section 8 of this chapter.
(B) After payment of attorney’s fees under clause (A), one third ( ⅓ ) of the remaining amount
shall be deposited into the forfeiture fund established by the prosecuting attorney to offset
expenses incurred in connection with the investigation and prosecution of the action.
(C) Except as provided in clause (D), after distribution of the proceeds described in clauses (A)
and (B), if applicable, eighty-five percent (85%) of the remaining proceeds shall be deposited in
the: (i) general fund of the state; (ii) general fund of the unit that employed the law enforcement
officers that seized the property; or (iii) county law enforcement fund established for the support
of the drug task force; as determined by the court, to offset expenses incurred in the investigation
of the acts giving rise to the action.
(D) After distribution of the proceeds described in clauses (A) and (B), if applicable, eighty-five
percent (85%) of the remaining proceeds shall be deposited in the general fund of a unit if the
property was seized by a local law enforcement agency of the unit for an offense, an attempted
offense, or a conspiracy to commit a felony terrorist offense (as defined in IC 35-50-2-18) or an
offense under IC 35-47 as part of or in furtherance of an act of terrorism. The court shall order
that the proceeds remaining after the distribution of funds to offset expenses described in
subdivision (3) be forfeited and transferred to the treasurer of state for deposit in the common
school fund.
IND. CODE § 34-24-1-4(d)(3) (2019).
237. In Marion County, funds are directed to two individual components of the City of Indianapolis
Law Enforcement Fund: the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) portion and the Marion
County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) portion. Id. In the vast majority of cases, orders of distribution allocate
70% of forfeited cash to the former and 30% to the latter.
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law-enforcement expenses are satisfied may a court order that forfeited funds
be deposited in the Indiana Common School Fund. 238
Once again, a comparison of disbursements of forfeited cash is instructive:
Cash Forfeiture Disbursements to Police and Common School Fund

Marion
County
Garrison’s
Cases

Forfeited
Cash to
Local Police
Departments

Percentage
of Forfeited
Cash to
Local Police
Departments

Forfeited
Cash to
Indiana
Common
School
Fund

$84,291.01

33.19%

$14,465.37

Percentage
of Forfeited
Cash
Directed to
Common
School
Fund
5.70%

$56,438.06

22.96%

$1,729.35

0.70%

The data confirms that prosecutors and police are the big winners when
cash is forfeited. Interestingly, prosecutors overall (public and private) took in
much more money for themselves when a private attorney was hired to
prosecute their cases on contingency fees. On the other hand, the Indiana
Common School Fund was the big loser when civil forfeiture cases were
handled by a private attorney. In these cases, very little was left over to deposit
into the Common School Fund after statutory shares were distributed to
prosecutors and police. 239 Despite legislative intent to “ensure that the
Common School Fund would receive a minimal amount for each case in which
assets are seized and forfeited,” 240 only twenty-one of Garrison’s sixty-three
238. If a forfeiture involves a terrorist offense, funds will be directed to offset those expenses as well
before funds can be deposited in the Common School Fund. See id. § 34-24-1-4(d)(3)(D).
239. In 2019, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected a state constitutional challenge to the diversion of
civil-forfeiture proceeds away from the Common School Fund and instead being used to reimburse lawenforcement costs. Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 607 (Ind. 2019). Article 8, Section 2 of the Indiana
Constitution provides that the School Fund shall consist of all forfeitures which may accrue. IND. CONST.
art. 8 § 2. While the court agreed, based on prior precedent, that this constitutional provision applies to civil
forfeitures, it held that a proper interpretation of the clause permits the state legislature to determine how
and when forfeiture proceeds accrue to the state. See Horner, 125 N.E.3d at 588–607.
240. See LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY OF OFFICE OF FISCAL & MGMT. ANALYSIS, FISCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, L.S. 6112, 2d Sess., at 2 (Ind. 2018). The Indiana legislature amended the required allocation
formula for disbursement of forfeiture funds, effective July 1, 2018. IND. CODE § 34-24-1-4 (as amended by
P.L. 47-2018). Most forfeiture cases analyzed in this section were subject to this legislative change: sixty-two
of Garrison’s cases and sixty-eight Marion County cases were closed on or after June 30, 2018. Case Search,
supra note 223. The legislature also enacted several additional minor amendments, effective July 1, 2019. IND.
CODE § 34-24-1-4 (as amended by P.L. 66-2019).
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cash forfeitures (one-third) resulted in a distribution to the Common School
Fund. In contrast, forty-eight of Marion County’s fifty-one cash forfeitures
(94%) provided monies to the Common School Fund. 241
The 2018 court data, though limited, provides support that civil forfeiture’s
profit motive adversely influences prosecutorial behavior, especially when
contingency fees for private lawyers are permitted. The data reveals
troublesome disparities between private and public prosecutors when
considering rates of default and settlement as well as outcomes and
disbursements. Even apart from these disparities, the strong appearance of a
conflict of interest requires prompt action to end contingency-fee
compensation in the prosecution of civil forfeiture cases. Smaller counties may
contend that they need a private lawyer to handle civil forfeiture cases because
of their scarce resources. The data suggests otherwise. Of Garrison’s
eighty-seven cases handled across multiple counties, fifty-nine cases were
default judgments which should have required only pro forma administrative
resources and little, if any, attorney time or expertise. 242 There is no reason that
a full-time government prosecutor acting on behalf of multiple counties could
not handle Garrison’s workload for less money and without conflicting
concerns. Moreover, if there is a compelling need for a private lawyer to step in
on a temporary basis, the lawyer should always be compensated on a flat fee or
on an hourly basis to avoid both actual conflicts and the appearance of conflicts.
CONCLUSION
Courts are duty bound to refuse to enforce contracts that are illegal or
against public policy. 243 One hundred years ago, the New Mexico Supreme
Court struck down a contingency-fee arrangement in a criminal case between a
prosecutor and a private lawyer that provided for one fee in the event of the
accused’s acquittal and a larger fee in the event of a conviction. 244 The court
found that a fee arrangement dependent on the outcome of the case distorted

241. Despite the significant difference between cases handled by private and government prosecutors,
the total amount of funds distributed to the Common School Fund from all civil forfeiture cash proceeds
proved to be quite small. Out of a total of $499,777.61 in forfeited cash from 2018 cases, the Common School
Fund received only $16,194.72, or just 3.24% of all forfeited cash. Prosecutors and police kept 96.76% of all
forfeited cash.
242. Case Search, supra note 223.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
244. Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730, 731 (N.M. 1920) (“Unlike a civil suit where the ability of the plaintiff
to pay any fee might depend upon the establishment of his cause of action, here, under no conceivable aspect
of the case, could the party’s ability to employ a private prosecutor in a criminal case be increased or
diminished by the outcome of the prosecution. On the other hand, we have injected into the prosecution of
a criminal case a prosecutor whose personal interests would be subserved best by securing the conviction of
the defendant, and this regardless of the question as to whether or not the defendant were guilty or innocent;
that is to say, the size of his fee, or possibly whether he receive any fee at all, would be dependent upon the
conviction of the defendant, however innocent he might be. This is contrary to the policy of our law.”).
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the obligation to seek justice by incentivizing a conviction regardless of
innocence. 245 Similarly, in a Pennsylvania criminal case involving a contingency
fee negotiated between a defense lawyer and his client, a federal court stated,
“It is hard to imagine a more striking example of blatant conflict between
personal interest and professional duty.” 246
Conflicting interests from contingency fees in criminal matters have
similarly plagued civil forfeiture prosecutions. The nation’s experience with
abusive civil forfeiture practices over the past several decades has taught us that
lucrative forfeiture proceeds directed to prosecutors and police incentivize bad
behavior. 247 As law enforcement has increasingly relied upon forfeiture monies
for equipment, salaries, and bonuses, the drive to forfeit property has often
overridden their sworn obligation to pursue justice. 248 Civil forfeiture trainings
245. Id. at 731–32; see also MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. EC 2-20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); AM. BAR
ASS’N, CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.4(k) (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition (“Defense counsel should not
enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case or in a criminal forfeiture action.”).
246. United States ex rel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In this case, there
was a contingency-fee contract for representation of a defendant who killed her husband and provided that
the lawyer’s fee would come from insurance proceeds that would only be paid out in the event of acquittal.
The lawyer’s behavior was directly affected by the inherent conflict: the lawyer never communicated to his
client (until he knew it was too late) the prosecutor’s offer to cap the charge at second degree murder if she
pled guilty prior to trial. Id.; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting
the lower court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer never discussed plea-bargaining
negotiations with the client where the contingency fee was based upon acquittal).
247. In addition to abusive practices briefly described earlier in this Article, there are also widespread
reports of abuse in the expenditure of forfeiture proceeds by prosecutors. For example, in 2019, Manhattan
District Attorney Cy Vance was reported to have spent nearly $250,000 of forfeiture funds over five years on
fine dining, first-class airfare, and luxurious hotels. See Zack Budryk, Manhattan DA Spent $250K in Civil Asset
Forfeitures on Travel, Dining: Report, HILL (Apr. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/briefingroom-blogroll/437398manhattan-da-spent-250000-in-civil-asset-forfeitures-on-travel-dining (based upon review of public records
obtained by The City, a nonprofit news outlet in New York City); Reuven Blau, High-Flying Cy: How Manhattan
DA Vance Spent $250K on Travel and Food, CITY (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.thecity.nyc/2019/4/3/2121117/
high-flying-cy-how-manhattan-da-vance-spent-250k-on-travel-and-food (reporting that the Manhattan
District Attorney’s office controls more than $600 million in funds seized by law enforcement in civil and
criminal cases). According to the Village Voice, the Manhattan District Attorney has $734 million in forfeiture
funds at his disposal that it characterized as a slush fund of “off-budget” proceeds obtained from asset
forfeiture. Jake Offenhartz, Cy Vance Has a $734 Million Slush Fund of Forfeiture Cash, VILL. VOICE (Feb. 15,
2018),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2018/02/15/cy-vance-has-a-734-million-slush-fund-of-forfeiturecash.
248. See Note, supra note 24, at 2391 (“The toxic relationship between criminal enforcement and civil
forfeiture is further exacerbated by the lack of regulations on spending forfeiture proceeds.”); Carpenter et
al., supra note 8, at 7 (“When expenditures were provided by category, most known spending by state and
local agencies was listed under equipment, ‘other,’ and salaries and overtime. Only tiny fractions went toward
substance abuse or crime prevention programs.”); Stillman, supra note 29 (detailing how police budgets
depend on forfeiture revenues to fund crime-fighting equipment, salaries, and officer bonuses and explaining
that in some Texas counties, forfeitures fund nearly 40% of police budgets); see also C.J. Ciaramella, New York
Prosecutors Gave Themselves $3.2 Million in Bonuses with Asset Forfeiture Funds, REASON (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://reason.com/2017/11/28/new-york-prosecutors-gave-themselves-32 (“The Suffolk County District
Attorney’s Office in New York doled out $3.25 million in bonuses to prosecutors from its asset forfeiture
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that provide police and prosecutors with detailed instruction on “defeating the
objections of so-called ‘innocent owners’ . . . and keeping the proceeds in the
hands of law enforcement” certainly bolster this contention. 249
There is no reason to expect better results when we authorize private
lawyers to stand in the shoes of government prosecutors. States, like Indiana,
compound this problem when they authorize prosecutors to delegate their
official functions to part-time private lawyers whose compensation is tied to
how much private property they can forfeit. The time is long overdue for this
unethical practice to be prohibited in professional conduct rules and for courts
to refuse to enforce such contingency-fee contracts as violative of public policy.
Ultimately, all states should amend their civil forfeiture laws to explicitly
prohibit contingency fees for all prosecutors, public or private.
The stakes are simply too high, especially for low-income and minority
property owners, to lose hard-earned property to private lawyers pursuing
personal gain while standing in the shoes of the sovereign. Decades of
experience confirm that “[p]rofit motives . . . distort the discretion of police,
prosecutors, courts, and local officials” and that “[w]hen courts are used to raise
money, officials have less incentive to make adjudications fair.” 250 With no right
to counsel for indigent property owners, the proverbial fox has been placed in
charge of the hen house while contingency fees compromise the neutrality,
impartiality, and integrity of our justice system.
To be clear, small legislative fixes cannot remedy these conflicts. Indiana’s
requirement that contingency fee contracts be reviewed and approved by the
state attorney general does little to restore public confidence. The court data
analyzed in this Article, though limited, provides additional evidence that
contingency fees adversely affect prosecutorial conduct to the detriment of
property owners. This data reveals higher default rates, lower settlement rates,
and a diversion of public funds into private pockets when contingency fees
fund since 2012 . . . .”); J.F., Fighting Crime Through Superior Steak, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/asset-forfeiture (noting that forfeiture
proceeds are not just used for policing activities; with little accountability, law-enforcement officials have also
spent them on extravagancies like expensive dinners, parties, and personal expenses); Joel Handley et al.,
Inside the Chicago Police Department’s Secret Budget, CHI. READER (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-department-civil-forfeiture-investigation/Content?oid=23
728922 (reporting that the Cook County, Illinois state’s attorney’s office’s 2016 budget anticipated $4.96
million in forfeiture revenues, which it earmarked to pay forty-one full-time employees’ salaries and benefits);
O’Harrow et al., supra note 40 (“Police agencies have used hundreds of millions of dollars taken from
Americans under federal civil forfeiture law in recent years to buy guns, armored cars and electronic
surveillance gear. They have also spent money on luxury vehicles, travel and a clown named Sparkles . . . .
The spending also included a $5 million helicopter for Los Angeles police; a mobile command bus worth
more than $1 million in Prince George’s County; an armored personnel carrier costing $227,000 in
Douglasville, Ga., population 32,000; $5,300 worth of ‘challenge coin’ medallions in Brunswick County, N.C.;
$4,600 for a Sheriff’s Award Banquet by the Doña Ana County (N.M.) Sheriff’s Department; and a $637
coffee maker for the Randall County Sheriff’s Department in Amarillo, Tex.”).
249. See Note, supra note 24, at 2392 (asserting that “the decision to pursue a forfeiture is often
governed not by justice, but by ‘department wish lists’”).
250. Developments in the Law: Policing, supra note 5, at 1734.
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compensate private prosecutors. Simply put, contingency fees have no place in
the prosecution of criminal or quasi-criminal matters. As long as Indiana retains
a bounty system to prosecute civil forfeiture cases, we can expect that innocent
property owners—and especially the poor and people of color—will continue
to lose their lawfully acquired property to the pursuit of profit.

